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Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the
excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis.
Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have called for the reform of
banker pay practices. In this Article, we argue that regulator pay is to
blame as well, and that fixing it may be easier and more effective than
reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis
resulted at least in part from a lack ofsufficient incentives for examiners to
act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid
for performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus
programs, the bonuses have been allocated in highly inefficient ways. We
propose that regulators, specifically bank examiners, be compensated with
a debt-heavy mix of phantom bank debt and equity, as well as a separate
bonus linked to the timing of the decision to take over a bank. Our pay-for-
performance approach for regulators would help reduce the incidence of
future regulatory failures.
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Why did the [regulatory] system fool itself?
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that executive compensation practices
helped precipitate the Great Financial Crisis. As a result, pay reform has
been a central focus for policymakers and scholars. 2 We agree that pay
practices likely contributed to the Crisis, but the problems were not
confined to Wall Street bankers' pay. The pay of Wall Street regulators is
to blame as well. Myriad tales of regulatory inertia preceding the Crisis
strongly suggest that regulators simply had insufficient incentive to act
aggressively in the face of banks' excessive risk taking.' We propose a
solution-performance pay for bank regulators.
Some note that banker pay may have been too high powered-too
focused on shareholder value and insufficiently sensitive to potential
losses, which would ultimately be borne by taxpayers.4 We assert that bank
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); PATRICK BOLTON,
HAMID MEHRAN & JOEL SHAPIRO, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 456, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff
reports/sr456.pdf, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247
(2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz,
Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (2011); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205
(2011); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global
Financial Crisis (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011).
3. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
4. Taxpayers bear the ultimate responsibility for failed banks, either from explicit insurance
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regulators' pay is not high powered enough and therefore, ironically, is also
insufficiently sensitive to potential losses to taxpayers. Currently,
regulators' pay is not in any way linked to performance. Bank regulators
are civil servants paid a fixed salary that does not depend on whether their
actions improve banks' performance, protect banks from failure, or
increase social welfare.5
In this Article, we show how bureaucratic pay for bank regulators can
lead to suboptimal regulatory action, and we propose incentive pay as a
solution. Specifically, we propose that in addition to salary, bank examiners
should receive incentive pay based on changes in the value of a debt-heavy
portfolio of the debt and equity securities of the banks they regulate. 6 In
addition, should a bank have to be taken over, the examiner would receive
a bonus related to the timing of the takeover decision. Giving examiners a
stake in bank performance, both upside and downside, will create better
incentives to promote optimal regulations, to intervene where necessary to
reduce bank risk taking, and to innovate to improve regulatory efficiency.
If incentives are well calibrated, examiners can capture some of the
benefits that accrue from making banks more valuable, while suffering as
well some of the negative consequences when banks fail.
For each of the largest banks, one or more permanent examiners are
assigned to supervise the bank as their full-time job. They have offices and
support staff at the bank, and they spend a good part of their working lives
as a regular presence at the bank they supervise.7 These permanent
examiners and the large banks they supervise are our focus.8 The idea of
incentive pay could be generalized to higher-level bank regulators (and
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or implicit insurance seen in the bailout of
Citigroup, Bear Steams, AIG, and other financial institutions. See infra Part III.B.
5. See infra Part III.
6. As described below, we propose that examiners be paid with "phantom" securities-cash
payments based on the market performance of their regulated banks' stock and debt securitics-instead
of actual securities of their banks. This approach avoids potential insider trading issues and the specter
of government control of banks. The equity securities we rely on are the publicly traded equity
securities of the bank holding company parent of the bank. Almost every large bank is held as a wholly
owned subsidiary of a bank holding company. See infra Part V.B.
7. Aaron Lucchetti, The Regulator Down the Hall, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011, at Cl.
8. Insofar as authority to supervise, control bank conduct, and impose regulatory sanctions rests
elsewhere, either as a matter of course or for a particular bank, then incentives should be placed there as
well. We discuss this in the context of the bank shutdown decision. See infra Part V.C. Where there is
more than one senior-level examiner, it might make sense to have incentive compensation for each
examiner above a certain level, just as many high-tech firms award stock options widely among
employees, or it might be more sensible to have only one examiner so compensated. In general, we
leave it to agency heads to decide the overall scope for the implementation of performance pay. See
infra Part VI.F.
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incentive pay may be needed there as well).9 For logistical reasons,10
however, our specific proposal centers on bank examiners. Given the
novelty of our proposal, we are content to advocate primarily for focused
experimentation with bank examiners. More powerfully incentivized bank
examiners may also reduce the need for market-based incentives at higher
levels. Incentivized bank examiners could be expected to push more
aggressively against a suboptimal status quo than examiners not so
incentivized."
Our proposal offers a partial remedy for some widely recognized
infirmities that routinely plague the administration of regulatory systems.
These include capture, indifference or slack, a lack of creativity or
innovation, a selection bias in who takes government jobs, and a mismatch
between skills and regulatory assignments. We believe incentives for
regulators could go a long way toward improving regulatory efficiency
without upsetting too much the current civil service system or the culture of
public service at bank regulatory agencies.
In the absence of high-powered incentives, it is assumed that those
individuals who self-select into regulatory jobs will value public service
and will do the work of aligning performance with desired social welfare
outcomes. But this proxy is obviously not perfect: some will choose
government jobs because the job demands may be less severe than in the
private sector; some may value public service but not in ways consistent
with social welfare-maximizing regulation; and some who would be great
regulators may be put off by the lack of incentives and absolute levels of
pay. There is undoubtedly some variation across regulators. Given this and
the seniority-based system of low-powered incentives, even those
regulators with the best motives and skills would not necessarily rise to the
top. This approach may not be the optimal way to motivate regulators, and,
in fact, we present strong evidence that it is suboptimal.
9. See infra Part VI.F (discussing the possible application of our proposal to higher-level
regulators).
10. The major logistical hurdle for applying our proposal to higher-level regulators is that unlike
permanent examiners, these regulators typically oversee multiple banks. Holding a portfolio of debt and
equity securities of multiple banks may create perverse incentives for regulators. For example, they may
be tempted to favor the most promising bank over others, instead of minding the safety and soundness
of each bank. See infra Part VI.F.
11. Our focus on examiners also requires that we limit the scope of our proposal to the period
before and including the decision to shut down a bank. Admittedly, important decisions are made after
the shutdown decision that affect bank creditor recoveries and the amount of losses left with taxpayers.
Because banks' securities are typically worthless once banks fail, however, and because examiners play
little or no role in the conduct of the receiverships that resolve failed banks' assets and liabilities, our
proposal's scope is necessarily limited to the period before and including shutdown.
2012] 1007
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We do not dismiss the value of attracting regulators imbued with a
desire for public service. We are mindful of the risk that financial
incentives might crowd out regulators' public-spirited motivations toward
conscientious regulation: putting a price on diligence might encourage
some regulators to slack.12 At the same time, however, regulators' dismal
performance in the Crisis makes us skeptical that public-spirited
motivations are sufficient incentive. At scores of banks, examiners and
other regulators were well aware of operational deficiencies and excessive
risk taking several years before those banks failed. 13 But regulators stood
still in the face of this information. They utterly failed to demand corrective
action by banks. Instead, examiners continued to rate these risky
institutions as "fundamentally sound." Washington Mutual, the largest
bank failure in U.S. history at the time of its failure, enjoyed a
"fundamentally sound" rating until six days before its collapse. 14
Defending regulators' existing incentive structure seems quite problematic
after the Crisis.15
We propose to improve regulators' incentives by adding or subtracting
pay based on an algorithm designed to better track the social welfare
interest in bank regulation. By paying regulators with a mix of securities
reflecting the full range of a bank's balance sheet, our proposal incentivizes
regulators toward striking a socially optimal balance between increasing
bank values and credit and reducing the costs of bank failure.
This could mean more or less regulation, depending on the bank and
the circumstances. For instance, examiners who gain from increases in
bank values (by having pay tied to bank equity values) may take steps to
make the examination process more efficient, to get the amount and type of
disclosures right, and to encourage valuable lending and risk taking.16
Examiners who lose from decreases in the value of bank debt may pursue a
more interventionist approach in some cases, since they bear some of the
losses arising from the socially inefficient risk that exists on their watch.
Regulators incentivized to worry about losses to taxpayers may be more
12. See infra Part VI.A.L
13. In the three years before Washington Mutual Bank failed, examiners spent over 100,000
hours over 400 days inspecting its assets and operations. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
15. Moreover, changing the financial incentive structure is also likely to affect the composition
of banking regulatory agencies over time. Performance-based pay may attract candidates different from
those who currently self-select into banking regulation under existing compensation schemes with low-
powered incentives. See infra Part VI.A. 1.
16. The debt component of this incentive pay helps to ensure that risk taking internalizes the
expected social costs of insurance.
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PAY FOR REGULA TOR PERFORMANCE
diligent in their supervision of bank assets and management, may be more
aggressive in assuring that corrective recommendations are implemented,
may encourage or require changes to bank balance sheets, and so on. The
mix of debt and equity securities (or phantom securities) will be key to
achieving the appropriate types and levels of examiner activity.
An added benefit is that the market will be fooled less often because
examiners will have incentive to act promptly when signs of trouble arise.
Examiners will marshal the private information they learn on the job to
improve regulation and their own compensation, and examiners' actions
will be reflected in the securities markets, albeit indirectly and over time.
Pay reforms to date have focused on the regulated, not the regulators.
The so-called "pay czar," Kenneth Feinberg, enjoyed wide authority to
dictate pay at banks receiving emergency funding under the Troubled Asset
Relief Program ("TARP")." The Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") adopted several reform proposals
targeting banker pay. For example, "say on pay" provisions require banks
(along with other public companies) to conduct regular advisory
shareholder votes on executive pay.' 8
Academics have proposed other approaches as well. For instance,
Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann argue that bankers should be paid
not just with equity but with a slice of the entire capital structure of their
bank holding company in order to better internalize the actual costs of
corporate decisions on various stakeholders.19 One of us has argued
elsewhere that a better approach would be to pay bankers with subordinated
debt of their banks.20 These academic proposals intend to link banker pay
more closely with the social welfare outcomes expected from banking
activity levels and risks.
Our approach has a similar goal, though regulators would have a
17. Aaron Lucchetti, David Enrich & Joann S. Lublin, Fed Hits Banks with Sweeping Pay Limits,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at Al.
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951,
124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1907 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). In addition, banks must
disclose incentive-based compensation tied to financial outcomes, id § 953, and must adopt a three-
year claw-back policy in the event of a subsequent financial restatement that suggests incentive
payments should not have been made, id. § 954. The policy must require return of incentive payments
that would not have been awarded under the restated financial statements. Id. The penalty for
noncompliance is delisting. Id. Interestingly, only the regulated parties suffer the claw-back possibility;
regulators, who also received bonuses during the inflation of the housing and finance bubble, get to
keep theirs.
19. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2, at 271.
20. Tung, supra note 2, at 1207.
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greater focus on avoiding losses under our approach than CEOs would have
under these other academic proposals. The reason is straightforward: CEOs
should be focused mostly on creating individual firm value, while
regulators should be mostly focused on minimizing risk. In other words,
CEOs have control of the accelerator, while regulators man the brake.
While the optimal pay package for CEOs should contain a bit of brake, as
we explain below, the optimal pay package for regulators should include a
bit of accelerator. Moreover, a well-structured incentive pay arrangement
for regulators would respond to the structure of bank CEO incentives, since
regulators must lean against the risk-inducing features of bank CEO pay.
Finally, though the reform of regulator pay and bank CEO pay are not
mutually exclusive, our proposed regulator pay reform offers potentially
significant advantages over proposed banker pay reforms, including
relative ease of implementation. 21
We do not view our project as a search for perfect regulatory
incentives. Instead, we believe that incorporating incentive-based pay as
one component of regulators' compensation works an improvement over
current practice. The key is finding metrics for measuring "good" and
"bad" performance in government, and deploying them in ways that will
not make things worse. Fortunately, as we show below, reasonable metrics
exist in banking regulation, making this a good test case for a more general
commitment to pay for regulatory performance. As has been the case with
executive pay, we fully expect there will be learning over time as inevitable
problems arise with our proposal. But much has already been learned from
the trials and errors in designing executive compensation, so that
implementation of our proposal would hopefully avoid some obvious
pitfalls of incentive compensation.
While we leave it to agency heads to develop optimal compensation
practices over time, we believe even small steps in the direction of our
proposal could have large effects on the efficiency of banking regulation.
The need to incentivize regulators is especially important after Dodd-
Frank, whose say-on-pay provision is likely to generate even higher-
powered incentives for managers to maximize shareholders' private
interests. High-powered bank CEO incentives require a corresponding
impetus for regulators to proactively constrain bank risk taking. 22
21. See infra Part VI.C.
22. See Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper
Incentive Pay, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 385, 421 (2010) (proposing equity-based incentive pay for auditors in
order to counteract the effect of high-powered equity incentives for executives that encourage securities
fraud and financial misreporting).
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To make our case, we proceed as follows. Part II offers background
and context for our incentive pay proposal for regulators. In Part III, we
describe the current incentive model for banking regulators, its failure in
the Financial Crisis, and theoretical criticisms of this model. In Part IV, we
elaborate the theoretical case for paying banking regulators according to
their performance. We also define what good and bad performance looks
like, tying these to objective metrics that can be used to design pay
systems. Part V then describes in more detail what exactly a pay-for-
performance contract might look like for a bank examiner, including a
discussion of the mix of consideration types that could be used. In Part VI,
we offer some qualifications and address some limitations to our proposal.
Part VII concludes.
II. REGULATORS' PAY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
This part sets the context for our reform proposal. It recounts early
discussions of the possibility of incentive pay for government officials, as
well as recent innovations in regulator pay.
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE PAY FOR REGULATORS
We are not the first to point out the problems with the standard pay
structure for bureaucrats. Four decades ago, Gary Becker and George
Stigler published their seminal article arguing for incentive pay for the
enforcement of laws.23 Others extended the argument, developing various
economic models demonstrating the potential efficiency gains from
introducing market-based incentives in the compensation of government
officials. 24 Susan Rose-Ackerman authored an important contribution in
support of this idea, noting that regulators need to be "both competent and
motivated." 25 She pointed out how economic incentives could do important
23. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Contracts with
Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON.
REv. 20, 28-29 (1978) (detailing the conditions under which incentive pay for law enforcement
officials is efficient). A related question is whether and how best to hold public actors, like the police,
school officials, and other bureaucrats liable for constitutional violations. After all, holding someone
liable ex post for bad conduct is similar to adjusting their pay ex ante to pay only for good conduct. For
a comparison between the public and private approaches to this problem, see M. Todd Henderson,
Qualified Immunity for Corporate Directors (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
25. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Reforming Public Bureaucracy Through Economic Incentives?, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 131, 131 (1986).
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work in providing motivation.26 Importantly, she explored the delicate
tradeoffs implicated by the deployment of market-based incentives in
bureaucratic environments.27
Unfortunately, these academic insights have found no purchase among
policymakers: forty years later, bureaucrats are still paid like bureaucrats.
The timing of these articles (roughly 1974 to 1986) was probably
inauspicious: during this period, CEOs were paid like bureaucrats too. It
was not until four years after Rose-Ackerman's proposal that Michael
Jensen and Kevin Murphy published their path-breaking article in the
Harvard Business Review arguing for incentive pay for CEOs.28
Summarizing pay practices of publicly traded companies at the time, they
concluded that "corporate America pays its most important leaders like
bureaucrats," instead of owners. 29 They advocated for a dramatic increase
in the use of stock option compensation.30 Unlike the academic proposals
on incentivizing government actors, the Jensen and Murphy article
triggered a decades-long process of fundamental change in the structure of
executive pay. Although some gripe at imperfections in current executive
compensation practices,31 no one doubts that CEOs now have greater
incentives to act in the interests of shareholders than they did before the
advent of incentive compensation.
We propose to apply that learning to the regulatory context to improve
regulator performance. Giving regulators a medium- to long-term stake in
the value of the regulated entity may encourage regulatory decisions that
improve social welfare. The key is to ensure that regulator pay properly
accounts for the social component of banking risk. The banker pay reforms
discussed above have traction because they include a social welfare
component in banker pay. These lessons can be applied to regulator pay as
well.
26. Id. at 132.
27. Id. at 133-34.
28. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May 1990, at 138.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 141.
31. To be sure, there are problems with current pay practices in the private sector, but the
consensus view is that the linkage between pay and performance has been a hugely valuable change for
social welfare. Even the strongest critics object to the implementation rather than the theory. See, e.g.,
LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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B. TOWARD REGULATOR PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
Our regulatory incentive-compensation proposal borrows not only
from the neglected economics literature of the past, but also finds hope in
changed pay practices for government officials implemented in the last few
years. The Obama administration has dramatically increased regulators'
salaries. According to public records, the number of federal government
officials earning six-figure salaries has skyrocketed. In the Department of
Transportation, for example, only one employee earned a salary exceeding
$170,000 at the start of the recession.32 Eighteen months later, that number
had ballooned to 1690 employees.33 The number of civilian employees in
the Defense Department earning $150,000 or more jumped from 1868 in
December 2007 to 10,100 in the succeeding eighteen months.34
A plausible impetus for this trend is the belief that greater pay will
bring better talent. Here, the federal government is simply following the
model that other governments have used. Most famously, Singapore has
used large pay increases to improve the quality of its regulators." While
such pay increases may be important in attracting talented people, paying
more does not necessarily generate optimal incentives.36 If it did, the
problem of CEO pay identified by Jensen and Murphy would not have
existed.37 CEOs were highly paid in 1990; they were just not paid for doing
the things their principals would want them to do.
Bank regulatory agencies have begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to
performance. During the period 2003 to 2006, three bank regulators-the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
("OCC")-paid out nearly $20 million in retention and performance
bonuses to bank examiners and other regulators.38 In 2006 alone, the FDIC
32. Dennis Cauchon, For Feds, More Get 6-Figure Salaries, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2009, at 1A.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Singapore's top ministers were paid nearly $1.3 million in 2007, based on a calculation that
pays two-thirds of the median of the top eight professionals in several top fields. Seth Mydans,
Singapore Announces 60 Percent Pay Raise for Ministers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/asia/09iht-sing.3.5200498.html.
36. Higher salaries may improve performance insofar as dismissal becomes more costly for
employees. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 23, at 6 ("This cost [of dismissal] can more than offset the
gain from malfeasance."). The job protection afforded by civil service rules, however, diminishes the
risk of dismissal considerably. See infra note Ill and accompanying text.
37. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 28, at 141 ("In most large companies, cash compensation
for CEOs is treated more like an entitlement program than as a way to motivate outstanding
performance.").
38. Matt Apuzzo, Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18,
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gave bonuses to 2000 bank examiners.39
This very modest move toward pay for regulator performance, while
perhaps a step in the right direction, has several shortcomings. First,
although $20 million seems like a lot of money, across three years, three
agencies, and thousands of regulators, most of the bonuses were likely
quite small and unlikely to provide much incentive to dramatically change
behavior.40 Second, the use of ex post bonuses may not yield incentives as
high powered as with other techniques, such as the mix of equity, debt, and
bonuses that we propose. At the time Jensen and Murphy wrote, CEOs
routinely received cash bonuses, and yet pay and performance were not as
tightly linked as when stock and stock options came into use.41 Ex post
bonuses do not generate as much accountability as ex ante incentive
contracts tied to outside metrics. To the extent that ex post bonus payments
are discretionary, they allow for the intrusion of non-performance-based
criteria, such as favoritism, political affiliation, racial or gender bias, and so
on. The linkage between bonuses and conduct that maximizes social
welfare may therefore be tenuous.42 To be sure, there is a tradeoff between
accountability and the ex ante costs of designing and implementing
transparent incentive structures. As explained below, however, banking
regulation may be an area where the objective elements of good and bad
performance make the ex ante design costs small relative to the potential
efficiency gains. Finally, ex post bonuses are likely to be one sided-that
is, paid in good times but not recouped in bad times. This is likely to bias
regulation in a particular direction.43
2010, 6:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/18/govemment-bank-regulator-bonus_n_
503712.html.
39. Id.
40. Exact individual figures are not available. Although one examiner was reported to have
received a bonus of about $40,000 on a salary of about $180,000, the large number of recipients means
the average bonus per year was likely more on the order of a few thousand dollars. See id.
41. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 28, at 139 (discussing cash bonuses and pay for
performance).
42. A recent audit of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") by the Office of the
Inspector General shows the general nature of the problem. See OFFICE OF AUDITS, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, REP. NO. 492, AUDIT OF SEC's EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION PROGRAM AND RECRUITMENT,
RELOCATION, AND RETENTION INCENTIVES 4-5 (2001), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/
AuditsInspections/2011/492.pdf ("[T]he SEC had only partially achieved the outcome of creating a
reward environment that is beyond compensation and benefits which contributes to attracting, retaining,
and motivating employees."). The report details numerous flaws in the agency's current compensation
practices. For instance, the SEC paid a bonus to an employee "who played a key role in the
investigation that failed to uncover Bernard Madoff's massive long-running Ponzi scheme." BUREAU
OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, OIG AUDIT SPURS CHANGES TO PLAN FOR EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION,
RECRUITMENT, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1623 (2011).
43. Claw-back rules for regulators similar to the Dodd-Frank provision would be one way of
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In the next part, we consider how these pay practices and a lack of
high-powered incentives for regulators may have contributed to regulatory
failure in the Financial Crisis.
III. REGULATORS' PAY AND THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS
There is widespread agreement that regulators failed to act
aggressively enough during the Financial Crisis. As detailed below, the
problem was not one primarily of access to information, lack of expertise,
or resource constraints. Reports on bank failures by various inspectors
generally reach the same conclusion: regulators did a
satisfactory job of identifying problems well in advance of failure, but
failed to act aggressively enough to remedy those situations." The
problem, in our view, was incentives. Regulators did not have the right
incentives to turn their recommendations into actual reforms of bank
policies.
Bank examiners are paid a fixed salary and have very stable
employment. Although a primary mission is to avoid losses to the federal
deposit insurance fund ("DIF"), they are not paid based on this metric. In
addition, with pay delinked from an objective performance metric,
regulators may naturally focus on bureaucratic tasks with observable
outcomes, rather than on more aggressive and costly actions with more
complex and less transparent cause-and-effect relationships. If a bank fails,
there are multiple causes to which blame can be assigned. But there is only
the examiner to blame if reports are not accurately completed and done
well. Under existing incentives, examiners might naturally conclude that
their job is well done simply by accurately describing problems and
bringing them to the attention of management and senior regulators. They
have no stake in doing more. Doing less, by contrast, means less work, less
hassle, less political pushback, and less risk, all for the same wage and
career results.
reducing this bias. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AUD-09-008, MATERIAL
Loss REVIEW OF SILVER STATE BANK, HENDERSON, NEVADA 1 (2009), [hereinafter SILVER STATE
REPORT], available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports09/09-008.pdf ("[A]lthough the FDIC identified
SSB's loan concentrations and funding sources as potential high-risk areas of concern in examinations
completed as early as 2005, the FDIC took limited actions to mitigate the bank's aggregate level of risk
exposure."). The same phenomenon occurred during the S&L Crisis of the 1980s. See FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s, at 24 (2000),
[hereinafter FDIC REPORT] ("[T]he analysis in this chapter shows that for most failed banks that had
had recent examinations, ratings generally did a satisfactory job of identification well in advance of
failure.").
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To see how this problem manifested during the Financial Crisis and
how pay for performance might have solved some of the problems, we
describe what bank regulators do and what they did wrong during the
Financial Crisis.
A. WHAT BANK REGULATORs Do
This section offers a thumbnail sketch of the basics of day-to-day
prudential bank regulation, since the individuals doing this work-bank
examiners-are the focus of our proposed compensation reforms.
1. The Bank Examination Process
Several federal agencies supervise banks: the OCC supervises national
banks; the Federal Reserve ("Fed") supervises state member banks and
bank holding companies; and the FDIC supervises state nonmember banks
and FDIC-insured savings banks.4 5 Although the rules, regulations, and
approaches of the various agencies differ, the basic approach is relatively
uniform. Regulators assess the safety and soundness of banks through
annual examinations of bank assets and operations.46 A senior bank
examiner (the "examiner in charge" or "EIC") leads an examination team,
which varies in size and composition based on the size and complexity of
the regulated bank.47 Importantly, the senior bank examiner leading the
team is delegated tremendous authority over the examination and the
regulated bank.48
There are several levels of hierarchy in the typical bank regulatory
agency. At the OCC, for example, EICs for large banks are overseen by
Deputy Controllers for Large Bank Supervision ("DCLBS").49 A DCLBS
"[e]valuates and approves the EIC's recommendations, including
45. FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 463 ("The FDIC also has back-up supervisory responsibility
for monitoring the condition of national banks and state member banks, and in fulfilling these
responsibilities it works with the other two federal regulatory agencies. Under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), it also has back-up authority to examine
thrift institutions as well. State banking departments supervise state-chartered banks.").
46. Id.
47. Id. at 462-63. The resources can be quite extensive. For example, the equivalent of twenty
full-time employees were involved in the supervision of Washington Mutual. See infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
48. Id. at 463 ( "This examiner has full responsibility for supervision of the entire examination
process.").
49. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK 9 (2007) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER's HANDBOOK], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/_pdf/banksupervisionprocess.pdf
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regulatory ratings and risk assessments" and "[a]pproves the supervisory
strategy for each bank.""o
The multistage examination process has two broad goals: review of
the quality of bank assets, with special focus on the bank's most important
assets-its loans-and analysis of the bank's financial condition and the
quality of its management and operations.s" The examination typically
occurs once per year.52 The process lasts from weeks to months, depending
on the size and complexity of the bank, its assets, and operations. 53 The
supervision of Washington Mutual ("WaMu"), one of the larger supervised
banks under the OTS, included annual examinations from 2003 to 2008
averaging about two hundred days.54 Reported hourly work data show that
the equivalent of twenty full-time examiners or assistants of various kinds
were devoted to supervising this one bank."
Examiners make local judgments about the credit quality of individual
assets.56 After discussion with loan officers and bank managers, examiners
make final determinations about how to classify particular loans for input
50. Id. at 9-10. DCLBSs are part of the OCC Supervisory Office, which comprises higher-level
regulators that oversee EICs. The Assistant Deputy Comptroller at OCC oversees the supervision of a
portfolio of small or medium-sized banks. The ADC has authority to "ensur[e] that the banks address
supervisory concerns, follow plans for corrective action, meet reporting requirements, and respond
properly to enforcement actions." Id. at 9. Although this seems like the locus of supervisory power for
bank examinations, it may not be the case. As described in the text, line examiners have significant
discretion in evaluating credit and management, and there is little an ADC can do if the examiner's
judgments in her analysis and reports do not reflect the actual risk at the bank.
51. FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 464. There are four stages of a typical examination: (1) off-
site analysis; (2) on-site examination; (3) preparation and approval of an official report; and (4) use of
informal or formal administrative actions designed to solve any problems or reduce losses to the
insurance system. Id. at 463.
52. The frequency of examination varies by agency and over time. For instance, the National
Bank Act of 1864 mandated that the OCC examine all national banks twice a year but allowed an
extension to three examinations every two years. Id. at 423. This policy stood until 1974, when the
OCC moved toward off-site examinations using statistical methods, and the average examination
schedule was more like eighteen months. Id at 423-24. With the passage of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), on-site examinations were required by
law. Id at 425. By the late 1980s, resident examiners were placed in the largest multinational banks,
and by the 1990s, larger regional banks also got resident examiners. Id. at 424. Similar changes were
also true of FDIC and Treasury examinations. FDIC examination periods varied from one to three
years, depending on the CAMELS rating of the bank in question. Id. at 425. Like for the OCC,
however, the FDICIA "mandated annual on-site examinations of all banks except highly rated small
institutions, for which the interval could be extended to 18 months." Id.
53. Id. at 425.
54. OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF TREASURY, EVAL-10-002, EVALUATION OF
FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 16-19 (2010) [hereinafter
WAMU REPORT], available at http://fdicoig.gov/reportsl0%5C10-002EV.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 464.
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into a final supervisory rating.s7 Examiners also review loan portfolios as a
whole for issues such as concentration risk, violations of legal rules, and
deviations from bank loan and underwriting policies. They assess the
behavior and impact of subsidiaries and affiliates, risks from litigation, the
costs and benefits of off-balance-sheet activities, and the activities of
insiders.58
Once the on-site review is done, the examiner presents the findings to
bank management, who are given opportunities to make comments, dispute
findings, and commit to remedying any deficiencies.59 Finally, the report is
taken to the board of directors, outside of the presence of management.
Directors are given a chance to express their views individually and as a
group. 60 To the extent problems have been identified, examiners typically
seek commitments from individuals or the entire board to take corrective
actions.6 1
Based on this process, examiners determine the bank's CAMELS
rating, which is the single metric used by regulators to capture safety and
soundness. 62 Examiners rate banks on a scale of I (good) to 5 (bad) in each
of six areas--capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings,
liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk-and then assign a composite
score.63 A score of 1 means a bank is performing far above average; 2, the
most common score, means "fundamentally sound"; 3 means "some degree
of supervisory concern"; 4 means generally unsafe and unsound conditions;
and 5 means severe problems and likely failure within one year. 6
On-site review is meant to "identify the risk of failure in troubled
institutions in sufficient time for supervisors to take corrective action."65
Another important tool available to examiners is a follow-up enforcement
action, which is designed to "control the risk-taking behavior of problem
57. Id. at 465. "The examiner will either 'pass' a credit or assign it to one of the following
categories: (1) special mention, (2) substandard, (3) doubtful, or (4) loss." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 465-66.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. See id at 465 (defining a "CAMEL" rating); COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at
10-11 (defining a "CAMELS" rating).
63. COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at 10-11; OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
DEP'T OF TREASURY, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK §§ 070A.4-070A4.13 (2011) [hereinafter
EXAMINATION HANDBOOK], available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/-files/422010.pdf. All scores are
reported. For example, 22122/2 would represent a typical rating.
64. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 63, § 070A.3-.4 (defining the significance of
each composite ranking level).
65. FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 432.
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banks after they have been identified."66 This may be necessary because
once the bank finds itself in peril, managers and shareholders have less to
lose from high-risk strategies. They have incentives to engage in
speculative lending or pursue other risky schemes, which reward
shareholders if successful, but place losses primarily with creditors or the
government if unsuccessful. 67 Follow-up enforcement therefore offers a
sensible regulatory tool.
2. Regulators' Power over Banks
Regulators have tremendous power to influence bank decisionmaking.
Much of the actual power resides with bank examiners in their conduct of
bank examinations. The lead bank examiner has wide discretion as to the
volume of loans reviewed, the nature of the examination, the time spent on
each analysis, and the consequences of the examination results. Examiners'
decisions classifying specific loans are effectively unreviewable. Moreover,
the decision to drop a bank's CAMELS rating from 2 to 3 (moving the
bank from "fundamentally sound" to indicating "some degree of
supervisory concern") is largely, if not entirely, within the discretion of the
bank examiner. The examiner accompanies this downgrade with informal
actions, which include obtaining the bank's written commitment to take
corrective action.68 Only when the bank has deteriorated significantly-say
to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5-do regulatory higher-ups get involved in
meetings with the board of directors." To get a sense of how rare this
might be, WaMu kept its overall CAMELS rating of 3 until September 18,
2008;70 it failed seven days later.
The involvement of higher-level regulators typically includes the
taking of formal legal actions that are enforceable in the courts. 72 Although
66. Id
67. Id. at 439. This, of course, is the classic asset substitution problem for creditors.
68. Id at 441-42. This written commitment commonly comes in the form of a board resolution
creating a Memorandum of Understanding between the bank and the regulator. Id.
69. Id
70. WAMU REPORT, supra note 54, at 18.
71. Robin Sidel, David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to JP Morgan, in
Largest Failure in US. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at Al.
72. FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 441-42. These include cease-and-desist orders, suspension
or removal of officers and directors, and civil penalties. Id. at 444. Section 8 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act is exemplary of the powers given to bank examiners in this area. It gives the FDIC board
broad formal enforcement powers to terminate FDIC insurance protection, (§ 8(a)), to issue cease and
desist orders, (§ 8(b)), and to remove or suspend individual officers or directors, (§ 8(e)). Id. at 444
tbl.12.6. The FDIC has delegated many of these powers to the regional or examiner level. Some triggers
are automatic. For instance, FDIC policy requires formal action pursuant to section 8 when an insured
state nonmember bank falls to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5. Id at 473-74. Historically, many formal
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ultimate authority to enforce legal sanctions and modifications to bank
activity resides at administrative levels above the bank examiner, even in
that situation, examiners wield enormous influence because they control
the inputs into this decisionmaking process. Since increased monitoring or
regulatory intervention requires examiners to identify problems and pursue
initial ratings downgrades, effective incentives for examiners to act are
necessary for optimal regulation. Examiner passivity, by contrast,
effectively insulates a troubled bank from higher-level scrutiny and
corrective sanctions.
Not only do bank examiners and higher-level regulators have
tremendous authority over a range of bank decisions, but they also control
the general scope and intensity of the regulatory process as well.
Regulators enjoy enormous discretion over critical decisions in the
supervisory process." They have wide latitude to decide, among other
things, the amount of resources to devote to a particular examination;74
how often to conduct examinations; whether to conduct on-site or off-site
examinations; whether to focus on large or risky banks or large or risky
assets within a given bank; how to weight particular geographic
concentrations of banks or assets;75  how to extrapolate from past
actions were taken pursuant to section 8 and other laws, such as the Prompt Corrective Action rules. Id.
at 446 tbl.12.6. From 1980 to 1995, nearly 2400 formal actions were taken. Most were cease-and-desist
orders under § 8(b) (1485 of these), termination of insurance under § 8(a) (394 of these), and removal
of officers or directors under § 8(e) (369 of these). Id.
73. Consider the decision whether to shut down a failing bank, for example. Statutes generally
limit shutdown to "insolvent" banks. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006) (describing grounds for
appointment of a counselor or receiver). But the definition of insolvency is left to the discretion of the
regulator. A report on bank failures of the 1980s noted that at that time, the OCC "had wide latitude to
define insolvency and could have adopted a more flexible standard than it did." FDIC REPORT, supra
note 44, at 457.
74. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 426 ("From 1979 through 1984 both the FDIC and the
OCC reduced their examiner resources: the FDIC's field examination staff declined 19 percent, from
1,713 to 1,389, and the OCC's declined 20 percent, from 2,151 to 1,722. The Federal Reserve's
examination capacity remained almost unchanged.").
75. Geographic concentration of losses was true in both the S&L Crisis and the recent Financial
Crisis. During the S&L Crisis, about 75 percent of all bank and thrift failings were in Texas and
Oklahoma. Id at 456. For a more complete discussion of the issue of examination frequency in Texas
and the Southwest during the 1980s, see JOHN O'KEEFE, FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., THE TEXAS
BANKING CRISIS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1980-1989, at 1-14 (1990), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/texasbankcrisis_1980_1989.pdf (arguing that the decline in
the frequency of Southwest bank examinations was a contributing factor in the banking crisis). During
the recent Financial Crisis, loan losses in California, Florida, Nevada, and several other states account
for the bulk of the original losses that led to downgrades of mortgage-backed securities. See Press
Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, Investor Loans Major Part of Defaults in States with Fastest Rising
Delinquencies, MBA Says (Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/
56535.htm.
1020
PAYFOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE
performance to predict future performance of banks, assets, or particular
asset classes; and how and how often to share information with other
government agencies and the market.76Although some of these are not
under the control of individual examiners, examiners may at the very least
influence how these issues are decided.
B. REGULATORY FAILURE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
This section discusses the nature of regulatory failure in the Financial
Crisis. It first offers a broad overview based on postmortem reports by the
inspectors general of the various bank regulatory agencies. It then examines
two emblematic bank failures during the Financial Crisis in order to
highlight the impact that regulators' compensation structure may have had.
1. Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure
The reports of inspectors general of the Treasury Department conclude
that regulators did not do enough to prevent multiple banks from taking
excessive risk and failing. Although acute funding constraints were a
precipitating factor for many bank failures, this shock was not sufficient to
explain bank failures. One report explains that "[a]lthough the deterioration
in the bank's financial condition was severe in 2008, the underlying risks
were evident in the preceding years."" The consensus seems to be that if
regulators were more aggressive, hundreds of billions in losses could have
been avoided.
In general, regulatory failures fell into two broad but discrete
categories that correspond to the supervisory functions. Supervision is
designed (1) to recognize problems before they become significant, so that
actions to return the bank to a sound financial footing can be achieved at
reasonable cost, and (2) to limit losses to the government insurance funds
by "closely monitoring troubled institutions, limiting their incentives to
take excessive risks, and ensuring their prompt closure when they become
insolvent or when their capital falls below some critical level."
The first category is the failure to adequately inspect and supervise
bank risk taking during "good" times, that is, periods without financial
stress. We might think of this as a failure to do adequate preventive
76. Bank chartering authorities also have the power to appoint a conservator or receiver. See
FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 457 n.57. The FDIC has the power to terminate or suspend deposit
insurance. Id. at 443.
77. SILVER STATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 31.
78. FDIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 421.
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medicine. The failure reports describe many instances in which the
regulators did not meet even the basic obligations to understand bank risk
taking, ensure compliance with basic risk policies, and restrict certain types
of risk taking. For instance, regarding the failure of IndyMac in 2008, the
Treasury Department Inspector General concluded that "examiners did not
identify or sufficiently address the core weaknesses that ultimately caused
the thrift to fail until it was too late." 79 As noted above, problems often
resulted from the failure to deploy regulatory tools as banks took
increasingly large and risky positions.
The second category is the failure to react to signs of distress and
intervene quickly enough to prevent further damage, which the $2.5 billion
collapse of NetBank illustrates. According to the Treasury Department
Inspector General, the OTS "did not react in a timely and forceful manner
to certain repeated indications of problems."so A similar lapse preceded the
$2 billion failure of ANB Financial. The regulator-the OCC-"did not
issue a formal enforcement action in a timely manner" after the bank began
to suffer losses and experience distress. 1
The failure reports show that in both categories of supervision,
regulators engaged in more box checking and paperwork than aggressive
oversight. For instance, WaMu's regulator did not "formally track the
status of examiner recommendations and [require] corrective actions." 82
Bank examiners did the important work of assessing bank assets and risk.
They saw deficiencies and recommended changes, but then never followed
up to see if these changes were being made. This same phenomenon
recurred with shocking frequency in the recent bank failures. 83 A typical
report "found that bank management did not effectively implement key
examiner recommendations over several examination cycles regarding such
79. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AUDIT REPORT, SAFETY AND
SOUNDNESS: MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF INDYMAC BANK 14 (2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13059311/lndymac-Bank-Thrift-Financial-Report. The summary of the
regulators' actions in the more than $2 billion failure of ANB Financial National Association is typical:
"OCC ... was not aggressive enough in the supervision of ANB in light of the bank's rapid growth."
Apuzzo, supra note 38. OIG reports also noted the failure of bank examiners and officials in the nearly
$1 billion failure of Omni National Bank ("OCC's supervision of Omni National Bank was
inadequate," Treasury investigators concluded); the nearly $2 billion collapse of New Frontier Bank
("In retrospect, a stronger supervisory response at earlier examinations may have been prudent,"
FDIC's inspector general concluded); and dozens more. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. WAMu REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
83. See SILVER STATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 15 ("Greater supervisory emphasis could have
been placed on the bank's failure to ensure full compliance").
1022 [Vol. 85:1003
PAYFOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE
controls as loan-to-value limits, interest reserve policies, stress testing and
establishing meaningful concentration limits, and maintenance of a
sufficient [allowance for losses] and adequate capital structure." 84
A more in-depth examination of two failures offers context.
2. Silver State Bank
Silver State Bank was a Nevada bank regulated by the FDIC. Like
many banks, it grew rapidly during the housing boom of the 2000s, betting
heavily on residential and commercial real estate, especially in and around
Las Vegas. When the bank failed in 2008, it cost the taxpayers about $550
million, and obliterated over $20 million in uninsured deposits.8 5
Regulators knew the risks Silver State was taking and the fragility of
its financial position for at least six years prior to its failure. Examiners
knew of problems with Silver State's board of directors and management as
early as January 2002, and continued to report on them consistently
through June 2008.86 Though examiners repeatedly raised issues about the
soundness of the bank's business model, they "did not assertively address
examination findings that were repeated areas of concern." 87
The supervisory problem was not a lack of understanding but of
inaction: "[W]hen needed, a more progressively stringent supervisory tone
was not presented in the [reports of examinations], and actions were not
taken."88 More specifically, although "the FDIC identified [the bank's]
loan concentrations and funding sources as potential high-risk areas of
concern in examinations completed as early as 2005 .... the FDIC took
limited actions to mitigate the bank's aggregate level of risk exposure." 89
This inertia manifested most obviously in the CAMELS rating, the
key driver of informal and formal regulatory action. Despite the fact that
examiner reports expressed significant misgivings about the bank's safety
and soundness, the CAMELS rating remained a 2 ("fundamentally sound")
until May 2007, when the bank was on the verge of complete failure. While
noting that examiners failed along many dimensions of data collection and
84. Id at 30.
85. See Jake Bernstein & A.C. Thompson, The Small Bank Bust, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 26, 2009,
6:10 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-small-bank-bust-090126.
86. SILVER STATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 15.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 15. "Nonetheless, our view remains that DSC could have exercised greater supervisory
concern in the 2007 and prior examinations regarding SSB's management, asset quality and liquidity
and taken additional action to address both the conditions and risks in these areas." Id. at 30.
89. Id at 5-6.
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analysis,90 the inspector general concluded that the bank collapsed not
because examiners did not know about the problems, 91 but because they did
too little to prevent them from growing. Examiners did not follow through
and hold the bank to account for the failures and shortcomings identified.
The report does not offer compelling reasons why regulators would
choose to be so diligent in diagnosis but relatively inattentive when it came
to treatment. But it echoes a common theme with other failure reports:
Examiners devoted far more attention and resources to figuring out what
was wrong with banks than trying to fix them. 92
3. Washington Mutual
The failure of WaMu tells a similar story. WaMu was the largest
financial institution supervised by the OTS.93 Right before it failed in 2008,
WaMu had over 40,000 employees working in over 2000 branch offices,
servicing nearly $200 billion in deposits and over $125 billion in residential
loans.94 In the years before its failure, WaMu refashioned its business
model to pursue higher risk. Management decided to shift away from
originating plain-vanilla mortgages (fixed-rate, conforming loans) to
higher-yield subprime loans.95 When the housing bubble burst, this
decision proved fateful, as it resulted in WaMu's collapse.
The problems at WaMu were not unknown to bank examiners in the
years leading up to its collapse. In the three years before its failure,
90. See id. (noting that examiners failed to "[r]ecognize and/or analyze risk, set a proper tone in
the [examination reports], or appropriately consider risk in CAMELS ratings," "[e]nsure that proper
controls and risk limitation and/or mitigation strategies were established and appropriately
implemented," "[ildentify in a timely manner [the bank's] increasing risk profile, including
concentrations in targeted market areas, as a potential concern," and "[d]eal assertively with bank
management on examination findings and recommendations").
91. See id. at 11. The examiner's reports recommended numerous improvements and corrective
actions. It "recommended that bank management improve its measuring, monitoring, and reporting of
concentrations; internal routines and controls; loan underwriting and administration; .. . compliance
with the FDIC's Rules and Regulations . . . [and] improve the monitoring and reporting of its economic
environment and the policies and procedures covering interest reserve loans." Id.
92. Although some doctors, like the fictional Dr. House on the eponymous Fox television
program, undoubtedly diagnose patients only for the fun of solving the puzzle, for almost all patients,
the diagnosis is only relevant to treatment. As we discuss in the next section, examiners were paid
mostly for diagnosis, and if healers are not paid to treat as well, there will be less treatment than if they
are.
93. WAMu REPORT, supra note 54, at 16. At the time, banks effectively chose their regulators
and paid regulators assessment revenue. From 2003 to 2008, WaMu represented 12 to 15 percent of
OTS's total assessment revenue. Id.
94. See WAMU REPORT, supra note 54, at 60 app.2.
95. Id. at 8.
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examiners spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days pouring over WaMu's
assets and operations. 96 As early as 2003, bank examiners had reported
significant deficiencies in WaMu's underwriting process for residential
loans, its core loan activity.97 Specifically, examiners noted that
organizational controls were weak and that the sales culture was
aggressively focused on building market share at the expense of quality and
process.98 Over the next several years, examiners repeatedly criticized
WaMu for its underwriting practices and overly risky incentive structures. 99
Examiners made nearly five hundred formal criticisms and
recommendations during this period. 00 However, they did not follow up to
assure that problems were remedied. They brought no enforcement actions
against WaMu, despite the fact that the problems persisted and worsened.
Crucially, many of these deficiencies were in core underwriting functions,
which the OTS examination handbook describes as vital to safety and
soundness of banks: the "first defense against excessive credit risk is the
initial credit-granting process."' 0
Asset quality is the other essential component of safety and soundness.
Here too, examiners raised numerous issues but took no action. Examiners
"repeatedly identified issues and weaknesses associated with WaMu's asset
quality," but "[n]evertheless . . . consistently assessed WaMu's asset
quality as satisfactory, with a rating of 2 until [WaMu failed]." 02
The most likely explanation for the regulatory forbearance was the
fact that during the period in question (2004 to 2006), WaMu appeared to
be profitable. When asked by the inspector general why they did not act in
the face of these numerous deficiencies, examiners responded, "even
though underwriting and risk management practices were less than
satisfactory, WaMu was making money and loans were performing [and]
[a]ccordingly, the examiners thought it would have been difficult to lower
WaMu's asset quality rating." 0 3
Although one might normally commend the humility of regulators in
the face of market indicators, such a defense is flatly inconsistent with the
nature of the government's role as an insurer of bank risk. Moreover, it
96. Id. at 17 tbl.5.
97. Id. at 21.
98. Id.
99. Id at 21-22.
100. Id. at 19 tbl.7.
101. Id at 20-21.
102. Id. at 19-20.
103. Id at 20.
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contravenes explicit regulatory policy, which instructs examiners against
taking comfort in loan and market performance in the face of underwriting
or concentration risks. If a bank "has a high exposure to credit risk, it is not
sufficient to demonstrate that the loans are profitable or that the association
has not experienced significant losses in the near term."1 04 As in the case of
underwriting standards, the inspector general found it puzzling that
examiners did not downgrade WaMu's CAMELS rating in the face of these
longstanding shortcomings.los
The WaMu examination process was emblematic of the regulatory
failures of the Financial Crisis. As with the failures of Silver State Bank,
IndyMac, and countless others, the report criticizes examiners for not
acting preventively, not tracking the implementation of corrective
measures, and relying solely on persuasion and future threats instead of
formal action. 106
C. A PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNT
In this section, we offer an answer to the questions raised by the
WaMu report: Why would examiners, who repeatedly identified problem
areas, continue to rate WaMu so highly in the face of such obvious
shortcomings in its business model and practices? Why did examiners err
so egregiously on the side of nonintervention in the face of specific policy
guidance to the contrary? The answer is incentives. 107
104. Id.
105. Id. ("Given this guidance, the significance of single family residential lending to WaMu's
business, and the fact that the OTS repeatedly brought the same issues related to asset quality to the
attention of WaMu management and the issues remained uncorrected, we find it difficult to understand
how OTS could assign WaMu a satisfactory asset quality 2-rating for so long. Assigning a satisfactory
rating when conditions are not satisfactory sends a mixed and inappropriate supervisory message to the
institution and its board, and is contrary to the very purpose for ... the CAMELS rating system.").
106. See id. at 3 ("OTS's supervision did not adequately ensure that WaMu corrected those
problems early enough to prevent a failure of the institution. Furthermore, OTS largely relied on a
WaMu system to track the thrift's progress in implementing corrective actions on hundreds of OTS
examination findings.").
107. Another potential story of failure is that regulators were under-resourced. But this is difficult
to square with the facts. Although the amount of resources devoted to examinations undoubtedly played
a role in the failure of banks during the Financial Crisis, the numerous failure reports suggest the
problem was as much one of incentives as it was hours devoted. For instance, the OG report about
WaMu's demise describes the resources the OTS devoted to supervision. Over a six-year period leading
up WaMu's failure, OTS examiners spent over 160,000 hours (about 27,000 per year on average)
working exclusively on supervision of WaMu. See id. at 17 tbl.5. Examinations averaged about 150
days in length and were conducted by the equivalent of twenty full-time employees. See id. at 17 tbl.6.
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1. Pay for Bureaucratic Performance
If an individual is paid regardless of performance, then the individual
will likely maximize something other than performance. This might be
leisure or something else, but it is unlikely to be the social welfare
maximum.os Like everyone else, bank examiners maximize according to
the incentive structure in which they find themselves. Bank examiners are
paid almost entirely in fixed salary that varies primarily by seniority.109
Examiners also cannot easily be terminated. They enjoy the special job
security fashioned by the civil service rules. This employment arrangement
may encourage examiners to perform the observable aspects of their charge
carefully and conscientiously-like conducting the bank examination and
filling out the required reports. But examiners may have insufficient
incentive to pursue the less observable or more discretionary aspects of
their charge with the same enthusiasm.
Job security for examiners may make some sense. With their fixed
salaries, if examiners could be terminated for poor performance, they might
be extremely risk averse. For example, if a bank failure on an examiner's
watch significantly increased her risk of termination, the regulator's
incentive would be to ensure that the bank was not taking much risk.
Though good for the regulator, the social cost from reduced credit
availability and lost bank profits might be quite high. Reduced job security
might also subject examiners to political pressure for doing their jobs too
well. Regulated banks might be able to bring political pressure to bear on
conscientious regulators unwilling, say, to allow a failing bank to continue
operating or to permit a bank's excessive risk taking."10
Job security reduces counterproductive risk aversion and the risk of
political capture. It gives examiners discretion in applying regulation,
perhaps in ways that improve social welfare. But without additional
incentives, the civil service rules may also create perverse incentives by
insulating regulators too well from the consequences of their job
performance. So insulated, some may be encouraged to exert low effort or
avoid courses of action likely to make more work for themselves."' Job
108. For instance, regulators might be envious of bankers, and therefore impose Draconian
limitations on them, or regulators might be sympathetic to bankers (either out of familiarity or a desire
for future employment) and therefore behave permissively. One cannot be sure how these incentives cut
in any given case; behavior is likely to vary widely by individual and over time.
109. Alyssa Fetini, A Brief History of the Keating Five, TIME (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.time.com
/time/business/article/0,8599,l848150,00.html.
I 10. Id.
111. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion,
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and salary security reduce incentives to do "good" work, however defined,
since the consequences of "bad" work are reduced.
2. Bureaucratic Incentives
With a fixed salary independent of performance and a remote chance
of termination, it is not surprising that examiners are not aggressive and
focus more on observable processes than outcomes. Performing the
examination and filling out examination reports is entirely within the
examiners' control. This output is subject to objective performance metrics
(for example, whether the report is completed on time and in a competent
manner). Without follow-up enforcement, the reports are not likely to
generate collateral costs for examiners, such as political pushback, extra
work for staff, and error costs. 1 12
In contrast, aggressive follow-up enforcement is likely to raise the
personal costs to examiners significantly with little or no personal benefit.
Costs rise simply because the work moves from investigation to persuasion,
both of higher-ups and the regulated party, each of which may push back
strongly. Examiners may also fear making a mistake by restricting the
lending of a seemingly successful bank. This problem may be exacerbated
by the fact that examiners routinely work with the same bank for extended
periods. 113 They often go to work every day at the bank they are
examining. While it is possible that familiarity breeds contempt, the
opposite effect, akin to the Stockholm syndrome, may also skew regulatory
decisions, especially where actions require confrontation. Collective action
problems may also arise. Examiners or regulators who choose not to do the
extra work could freeride to some extent on the more conscientious
regulators, which reduces all regulators' incentives to do the work in the
first place. Examiners bear little or no risk from bank failure and gain little
or nothing from bank success. After all, others are involved in determining
success or failure. In the event of a failure, there is no shortage of other
parties to blame. By contrast, if a report is not completed or done well, only
the examiner is to blame.
Moreover, the relative secrecy surrounding bank examinations may
also encourage regulatory inertia. Secrecy no doubt plays a useful role in
encouraging bankers to be forthcoming with their examiners. Secrecy also
and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. Sc. 873, 874 (2007) (positing that civil service rules select
for both zealots and slackers).
112. See JAMES Q. WILSON, WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 42
(1989).
113. Lucchetti, supra note 7.
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insulates banks from the possibility of public overreaction to negative
assessments from bank examinations, thereby avoiding the runs that
deposit insurance and banking regulation were meant to cure. At the same
time, however, secrecy also insulates examiners and the examination
process from public accountability. When the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Environmental Protection Agency issues an order or
takes other regulatory action against a violator, that action attracts public
scrutiny. Failure to act in the face of egregious circumstances similarly
attracts public attention. While public perception may not always be a
useful metric for evaluating regulatory action, at the least it forces
regulators to explain their actions-or inactions. Bank supervision, by
contrast, is largely free from this accountability because of the secrecy of
bank examinations. Bad news about a bank's condition cannot be made
public.' 14 So the public does not learn of either a serious downgrade to a
bank's CAMELS rating or a failure to downgrade. Only when a bank has
failed does the public ever learn about a bank's troubles, and by then, any
direct consequences from regulatory inertia may be difficult to detect.
Bank examiners and regulators are subject to the same interest group
pressures and incentives as other regulators. It is easier to please a
concentrated interest at the expense of a diffuse opposition than vice versa.
Concentrated interests make life difficult-they may sue, embarrass, and so
forth-while diffuse interests rarely raise a fuss. For example, according to
media accounts, around 2006, federal regulators noticed banks were
lowering underwriting standards and amassing large concentrations of
commercial and residential mortgage loans."' 5 Regulators issued very mild
warnings to reduce the concentration risk and raise capital to act as a
cushion against losses. The response was aggressive: "Though far from a
crackdown, even that mild guidance was too much for banks. Thousands of
industry comments poured in objecting to the regulators' intrusion, and the
FDIC and other agencies backed off, clarifying that they didn't intend to
impose limits." 116
Legal disputes may arise, and well-connected banks may be able to
exert pressure through the political process in the form of budgetary
restrictions for agencies or, worse, for individual examiners. Regulators
114. Studies do show that bank examination information does eventually leak out the public
securities markets and over time is reflected in securities pricing. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Sally M.
Davies, The Information Content of Bank Examinations (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No.
94-24, 1994), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/94/9424.pdf
115. See Bernstein & Thompson, supra note 85.
116. Id.
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interested in not appearing before congressional committees, defending
budgets, and being forced to testify in court would likely err on the side of
regulatory restraint, especially when they do not capture the upside from
aggressive regulation and do not bear much of the downside cost of laxity.
Raw partisan politics might also influence regulatory decisions. The
failure of Broadway Bank in Chicago is a recent example."' Alexi
Giannoulias was a former senior loan officer of the bank, which his family
controlled. The bank failed and entered government receivership. At the
time, Giannoulias was a candidate for the United States Senate from
Illinois. Ordinarily, regulators issue a "material loss report" within six
months of a bank's failure that estimates losses to government insurance
funds. In this case, however, regulators delayed issuing the report, which
reflected negatively on Giannoulias and his family, until after the
election." 8
There is also the revolving door problem. Some regulators are bound
to get some of their expected compensation from future employment with
regulated banks. To the extent that future employment depends on acting in
the public interest as regulators, then this form of deferred compensation
might be a positive incentive. If banks prefer to hire former examiners with
a good record in having helped banks avoid failure, then the deferred
compensation from the revolving door would act as a socially beneficial
incentive. If, on the other hand, banks prefer former examiners who acted
in ways desirable to banks but ambiguous as to the public interest, then this
could be a negative force pushing examiners to favor banks at the public
expense. For instance, banks might prefer former examiners who are
knowledgeable, who know the loopholes and the weaknesses of the
regulatory agencies, and who above all do not raise a fuss. These traits
might correspond with the kind of lax regulation described above, where
regulators excelled at identifying problems but failed miserably at doing
anything about them. In any event, there is no evidence that revolving door
payouts are linked to socially optimal conduct by regulators.
The clear incentive in the existing environment is simply to perform
the concrete tasks-like filling out forms and making recommendations-
as well as possible, and to disregard implementation on the margin, since
that is where costs are likely to exceed benefits. After all, it takes a great
117. See Ray Gibson, Federal Report on Giannoulias Bank Will Come After Election, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/cloutst/2010/10/federal-report-on-giannoulias-
bank-will-come-after-election.html (discussing the bank failure).
118. Id.
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effort to persuade a bank to act more conservatively, while there is little
gain to the examiner from doing so, in terms of either pay or prestige. To
be sure, some regulators would value doing the right thing and serving the
public interest, but given the ambiguity of these terms and the potential for
rationalization, the absence of monetary or reputational rewards or
sanctions means examiners care less than they would in the presence of
more high-powered incentives.
This is not to say that regulators were necessarily aware of these
biases and distortions of their conduct. A common refrain in bank failure
reports is the lack of awareness on the part of regulators. For instance,
regarding IndyMac, which in 2008 became one of the largest bank failures
in history, "[regulators] believed their supervision was adequate. We
disagree."ll 9 We do not doubt the honesty or good faith of the regulators
who felt that they were doing the best they could do. We simply observe
that regulators are influenced in ways beyond their ken, just as we all are.
They respond rationally to the incentives they face, and can rationalize
their conduct to fit to these incentives.
As earlier discussed, regulators apparently recognize some need to
improve individual incentives. Certain agencies adopted bonus structures in
the period before the Financial Crisis,120 but these one-sided bonus
payments likely exacerbated the incentive problems instead of ameliorating
them. As Ellen Seidman, the former head of the OTS, noted, "regulators
were part of the problem, and the bonuses were a symptom."l21 Seidman
attributed a large part of the regulatory failure to a lack of "standards for
evaluating how well people in the regulatory system were doing" despite
the fact that regulators thought they were doing so well.122
Perhaps regulators thought they were doing well because they were
maximizing to the best of their ability within their given incentive
structure. We propose to change that incentive structure.
IV. INCENTIVIZING REGULATORS
We propose to rely on market-based incentives to improve banking
regulation. Though our proposal may seem radical at first, we are not the
first to propose regulator bonuses or even to recognize that pay increases
119. Apuzzo, supra note 38.
120. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
121. Apuzzo, supra note 38 (quoting Ellen Seidman, research fellow, New America Foundation
and the former head of OTS from 1997 to 2001).
122. Id.
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may improve regulators' performance.123 Even bank regulators support this
approach.124
In making compensation decisions, the OCC is mindful of the need to
recruit and retain the very best people, and our merit system is aimed at
accomplishing that. . . .We also believe it is important to reward those
who worked so hard and showed such great professionalism throughout
the crisis. 125
Our innovation is simply to offer an unbiased, market-based approach
to allocating bonuses.
In this part, we first present a theoretical framework for thinking about
incentive pay for regulators. We then offer a mapping of our proposed
incentive structure, which illustrates that regulators' public-regarding
incentives should be calibrated to respond to the structure of bank CEOs'
private performance incentives. High-powered CEO incentives require
high-powered regulator incentives. We next discuss incentive design
issues: considerations in setting the level of regulators' incentives and
anticipated ancillary benefits from regulatory innovation.
A. A THEORY OF INCENTIVE PAY FOR BANK REGULATORS
Bank examiners enjoy enormous discretion in their supervision of
banks, and the quality of supervision depends in large measure on their
judicious exercise of that discretion. Incentives for optimal action are
therefore crucial. 126 These incentives could be achieved through a variety
of means, including the use of ex ante performance metrics and ex post
monitoring by more senior regulators, coupled with the use of various
carrots and sticks, including promotions, titles, office space, number of
employees supervised, money, and so on.
If superiors could design and implement this monitoring approach at
an acceptable cost, there would be little need for variable pay tied to
objective metrics. 127 But accomplishing this is often tricky, whether for
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See Apuzzo, supra note 38 ("These [bonuses] are meant to motivate employees, have them
work hard.") (quoting thrift office spokesman William Ruberry).
125. Id (quoting OCC spokesman Kevin Mukri).
126. This is not to say this is the only place where incentives are important. Incentives matter
throughout the hierarchy. The right form of incentives will depend on the relative costs and benefits of
the different types applied at each stage.
127. If such a system were optimal, there would be no need for monetary incentives. If it were
totally ineffective, the need for monetary incentives would be essential. Reality likely lies somewhere
along the spectrum between these two extremes.
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reasons of institutional inertia, workplace politics, or otherwise. Relying
solely on a monitoring approach has failed to produce good outcomes.
Monitoring may be enormously difficult, especially with respect to large
banks, where bank examiners make innumerable discretionary decisions
that are ultimately aggregated into all-encompassing safety and soundness
ratings. Short of a bank failure-when much of the damage has already
been done-these myriad discretionary decisions will be difficult to
monitor or evaluate.128 In this environment, the bureaucratic incentive
structure earlier described may simply overwhelm whatever carrots and
sticks are available to supervisors under the civil service rules. In this
situation, it makes sense to rethink the fundamental design of the carrots
and sticks. Organizations in this situation frequently resort to self-
triggering pay mechanisms tied to external, objective metrics, like stock
price.
Corporate executive compensation offers a useful analogy. CEOs act
as agents for shareholders, and before the 1990s, shareholders (acting
through boards of directors) tried a largely nonmonetary carrot-and-stick-
plus-monitoring approach to reducing managerial agency costs.129 This
approach was only modestly successful. It generated perverse incentives
for CEOs to game the metrics-for example, by empire building to
maximize company size and the number of employees. Boards were often
considered tools of their CEOs, and the payment of subjectively determined
bonuses ostensibly tied to performance was often suspect. The pay-for-
performance revolution in executive compensation arose because the costs
of better monitoring were thought to be higher than an approach tying
compensation to self-activating, objective metrics. It was far simpler and
more effective to link manager pay directly with shareholders' desired
outcomes (that is, to pay them like owners) than to design an ex ante set of
performance metrics and then monitor to ensure the conscientious pursuit
and achievement of those metrics.
The analogy to examiners is imperfect, however, since taxpayers are
the principals and examiners do not sit at the top of their organizational
hierarchies as do CEOs. But the incentive issues are generalizable to any
case in which there is a tradeoff between design of internal metrics and
monitoring on the one hand, and objective, external metrics on the other
hand. Moreover, firms offer other examples more closely analogous to
examiners. For instance, salespeople often enjoy incentive pay tied to
128. Moreover, a bank failure has multiple causes, so that even in that dramatic event, it may not
be easy to tell whether examiners were at fault. See supra Part Il.B.
129. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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specific external metrics, like sales volume or even stock price, and
oftentimes sales staffs are the only ones in the firm hierarchy to receive this
kind of compensation. That is, salespeople may enjoy higher-powered
incentives than their managers. This is because salespeople occupy the
place in the distribution chain with the greatest independence and
discretion and where the design and monitoring of behavior is likely to be
the most difficult. Examiners occupy an analogous place in the bank
supervision hierarchy. Examiners are at the sharp end of the regulatory
stick. They enjoy wide discretion in evaluating banks' assets and
operations, and as the Crisis demonstrated, their continuing blessing or
indifference can shield a troubled bank from corrective action long past the
point of salvageability.
B. MAPPING INCENTIVE PAY FOR REGULATORS
This section explains our approach to incentive pay for regulators.
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework for thinking about incentive
compensation for bank regulators that incorporates the structure of bank
CEO incentives. Regulators' incentives to constrain excessive bank risk
taking must be adequately matched to bank CEO incentives to pursue
excessive risk. Otherwise, regulators may be insufficiently motivated to
fend off bankers' risk plays.130
On the vertical axis is the level of effort exerted by the agent, be it
bank CEO or regulator; on the horizontal axis is the purpose or end goal of
that effort. At the left end of the horizontal axis is the private purpose of
shareholder wealth maximization; at the right end is the public purpose to
avoid losses to the government insurance fund. Both axes are measured
from the point of view of the principal for the agent in question:
shareholders and the public, respectively.
1. Performance Pay for Bankers
In this framework, the ideal point from the perspective of shareholders
of an ordinary company would be high effort for the purely private interests
of the company. This is the upper left corner of our Purpose-Effort
compensation space in Figure 1. Compensation contracts we observe for
public company executives aim for this corner solution, but given positive
agency costs, the practical result is a deviation in the direction of lower
effort. In addition, given the business judgment rule and other permissive
130. See Hannes, supra note 22, at 390 (proposing high-powered, equity-based incentives for
auditors in order to counter managers' incentives to artificially inflate share prices).
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rules that enable corporate agents to pursue goals other than shareholder
wealth maximization, there may be deviation toward public purposes as
well.
FIGURE 1.
Shareholder
ideal point
Social welfare ideal
point
iwi~ -
Shareholder wealth
maximization
Avoid losses to governnent
insurance
Purpose
Prior to the Financial Crisis, bank CEOs were roughly in the same part
of the Figure 1 compensation space as CEOs of nonfinancial firms, since
the CEOs of large multinational corporations and large bank holding
companies had very similar compensation contracts. CEOs of both kinds
were paid mostly in stock and stock options, which are designed to move
CEOs as close to the shareholder ideal point as is efficient given
monitoring costs.
The Financial Crisis, however, brought into clear focus the need to
alter bankers' pay packages to include a greater element of public purpose.
High
Effort
Low
Bank CEOs
I W
Regulators
II IV
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Given the government guarantees-either implicit, as in the bailouts of
Citigroup and AIG, or explicit, as with FDIC insurance-undergirding
bank risk taking, bank shareholders do not suffer the full costs from the risk
taking that comes with paying bank CEOs to maximize shareholder value.
Bank shareholders therefore have even stronger incentives than
shareholders of nonfinancial firms to push their agents toward the
shareholder ideal point. In this context, paying bank CEOs to maximize
bank shareholder value may result in socially inefficient levels of risk,
including systemic risk.
Though banks are private companies, their importance to the economy
and to the public, as well as their fragility in the face of runs, provide the
justification for government guarantees. At the same time, however, the
socially ideal point for banks in Figure 1 cannot be the shareholder ideal
point. Instead, because social goals as well as private goals should inform
banks' conduct, the social welfare ideal point toward which banks should
strive is somewhere to the right of the shareholder ideal point-that is,
away from private shareholder wealth maximization on the horizontal axis
and toward the public goal of avoiding losses to the government insurance
fund. We are agnostic about the appropriate proximity of the social welfare
ideal point to the corner solution of avoiding all losses to the government
insurance fund. We leave space between the social welfare ideal point and
the upper right corner in order to account for the real possibility that
maximizing social welfare may require a level of bank risk taking greater
than what would assure no losses to the government insurance fund.
Moreover, the location along the horizontal axis of this social welfare ideal
point likely varies by the type of financial institution, market context,
individual CEO, and other factors. We can only be confident that it lies
somewhere to the right of the shareholder ideal point.
Because of the public as well as private purposes that animate banking
and government support for banking, CEOs of banks, bank holding
companies, and other systemically important financial institutions should
be given incentives to take account of the social costs of bank risk taking
and bank failure.131 It is unlikely that bank CEO compensation was
optimally set prior to the Financial Crisis. Understandably then, the various
academic proposals for banker pay reform discussed earlier seek to move
the average bank CEO's compensation contract in the direction of greater
public purpose, that is, toward the social welfare ideal point and away from
131. For CEOs of public companies, by contrast, issues of systemic risk are largely irrelevant.
Therefore, no public purpose need be included as part of their optimal compensation contract.
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the shareholder ideal point.
The Bank CEOs arrow in Figure 1 illustrates proposed reforms'
attempt to move CEO compensation contracts from their current location
somewhere into quadrant 1.132 Any move in quadrant I increases the public
purpose of CEO effort and would therefore be a valuable change according
to these reforms.' 33 In general, moves in the direction of the social welfare
ideal point are likely to be social welfare improvements.
Moves into quadrant IV, which also increase the public purpose of
CEO actions, might also be improvements, but this would depend on the
tradeoff with reduced CEO effort. It might be that the gains from being
more public welfare regarding would be greater than the efficiency losses
from increased slack, but it is uncertain. What is clear is that any moves
into quadrants II or III would not be improvements.
2. Performance Pay for Regulators
We now turn to regulator pay. As shown on Figure 1, the moves are
analytically similar to the goal of improving bank CEO pay. Because of
their low-powered incentives and job security, regulators are thought to
exert less effort than the regulated. At the same time, regulators act more in
the public interest than in the private interest of the banks they regulate.
Regulators do not act purely in the public interest for familiar reasons of
capture, be it from familiarity, the revolving door enticement, or some
other cause. The public, who are the principals in this compensation
bargain, would prefer that regulators expend more effort toward the public
interest. The location of the social welfare ideal point on Figure 1 captures
this idea. Our proposal hopes to nudge regulators in that direction. And as
shown by the relative slopes of the two reform vectors, our proposal is
more focused on improving effort than improving purpose, while the
banker compensation reform literature has the opposite emphasis.
The structure of regulator incentives and bank CEO incentives are
related. For example, from bank shareholders' perspective, the optimal
private incentives for bank CEOs may depend on what risks and growth
opportunities the regulatory environment will permit.'34 Similarly, for our
132. Ironically, Dodd-Frank's say-on-pay provision, requiring a shareholder vote to approve
executives' pay, may actually move bank CEO compensation contracts away from the social welfare
ideal point and into quadrant II, where shareholders generally prefer their CEOs to focus.
133. A move along the vertical axis, that is, additional effort without any additional public
purpose, would obviously not satisfy these goals, while a move along the horizontal axis in quadrant I
would.
134. See Anthony J. Crawford, John R. Ezzel & James A. Miles, Bank CEO Pay-Performance
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purposes, the appropriate direction and magnitude of regulators' incentives
will depend to a great extent on the structure of bank CEOs' incentives.
The more high powered bank CEOs' private incentives are to maximize
shareholder wealth, the more high powered regulators' incentives must be
in the direction of the public interest. That is, regulators' public-regarding
incentives should be strong enough to counter the private risk-taking
incentives that banks create for their CEOs to the extent such risk taking
may be socially suboptimal.
As with bank CEOs, it may be that regulators' moves in quadrant IV
(less effort, more public regarding) would be socially efficient, but these
are not likely to arise from our approach to increasing the incentives for
effort.13 5 More difficult to judge in the abstract are moves into quadrant II.
Although not the main focus of our proposal, it is possible that incentives
to work hard may move regulators into this quadrant (more effort, more
private regarding). In this case, the gains from additional effort in helping
banks to be more efficient and reducing regulatory burdens might be social
welfare improving. That is, the gains may exceed the costs of expected
social losses from bank failures. The recent Financial Crisis cautions
against putting too much faith in this expectation, so our proposal makes
every effort to encourage additional effort for regulators directed into
quadrant I (and toward the social welfare ideal point), instead of quadrant
II.136
No incentives are perfect, however, so we do not expect bank
regulators ever to reach the social welfare ideal point. But with better
regulatory efforts in that direction, regulatory influence may drive banks'
vector of activity more closely toward the public interest.
Relations and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. BUS. 231, 252-53 (1995) (finding that bank CEO pay
became more high powered with the banking deregulation of the 1980s); Vicente Cuflat & Maria
Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors, 33 J.
BANKING & FIN. 495, 496 (2009) (same for 1990s banking deregulation); R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius
Palia, Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the US. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. EcoN. 105,
125 (1995) (finding a positive association between bank CEO pay and firm performance in the 1980s
and a stronger association in deregulated markets).
135. We can imagine other proposals that might make regulators more public regarding without
necessarily increasing their effort.
136. It is also possible that regulators might start to the right of the social welfare point. They may
harbor too strong a sense of purpose to protect the DIF or taxpayers. Therefore, their socially optimal
moves would be in quadrant II. Although this does not seem to be the case for many regulators during
the Crisis, when combined with the possibility of low effort, the case is stronger that some of this may
have been going on. Very low effort combined with even extremely strong motives to reduce taxpayer
losses could still explain the Financial Crisis. In such cases, a more shareholder-regarding motivation
could incentivize examiners toward the social welfare optimum. The use of bank equity in examiner
compensation is designed to achieve this goal, as we describe below. See infra Part V.A.
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C. How MUCH INCENTIVE?
An important preliminary question is the appropriate magnitude of the
incentive component of regulatory pay. We anticipate that a fixed salary
will continue to constitute the lion's share of regulator pay. At the same
time, the incentive component should be large enough to offer real
incentive to the regulator without swamping the regulator's salary in
importance. Too small an incentive component risks irrelevance, of course,
but too large an incentive component may stoke regulatory risk aversion.
Incentive pay is by definition variable, and a larger percentage of
incentive pay broadens the range of total pay that the regulator can expect
to receive-that is, it puts more risk on the regulator. If the incentive
component is so large that regulators cannot afford to suffer a loss, they
might simply take the conservative course, adopting a maximin strategy.13 7
They would be willing to forgo any potential gains from being aggressive
or innovative in order to avoid any losses.
Consider an examiner with a base salary of $100,000 and a variable
pay component with three possible outcomes: plus $40,000, minus
$40,000, and zero. If she regulates aggressively, she stands a fifty-fifty
chance of gaining or losing $40,000; if she regulates conservatively, her
variable pay will be zero for sure. If she is risk neutral and has low fixed
costs, then she should be financially indifferent between aggressive and
conservative regulation, since the total expected value in both cases is
$100,000. But a risk-averse examiner with larger fixed costs might strongly
prefer the conservative approach, since she will net $100,000 for sure.
Aggressive regulation is too risky, since the examiner runs a 50 percent
chance of winding up with a $40,000 loss, netting only $60,000 in total
pay. That possibility is sufficiently unattractive that even the chance to
make $140,000 would not induce her to regulate aggressively.
The design of the incentive securities will of course be important in
managing the variance in the incentive component of regulator pay. We
tentatively suggest that incentive pay should constitute up to 25 percent of
the regulator's total pay at the start of the relevant incentive period, but this
is just an informed guess. Agency heads who give thought to our general
idea and better understand the tradeoffs between financial incentives and
other factors may have good reasons for greater or lower percentages,
137. In game theory, this is a strategy designed to maximize one's minimum payoff. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
(1998).
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especially after some trial and error.
D. INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
Our performance pay scheme would not only help ameliorate the sorts
of "false negative" failures that facilitated the Crisis, but by giving bank
examiners economic stakes in regulated banks, our approach might also
spur regulatory innovation.
Under the current fixed salary approach, examiners have no strong
incentive to change the regulatory system in ways that improve or protect
bank values or taxpayer interests. Instead, as with the inertia they
demonstrated in the face of bad news at their regulated banks preceding the
Crisis, examiners may prefer just to do what they are told and work to the
letter of the examinations manual.
With a stake in the bank's value, examiners may come up with ways
to examine more efficiently-say, by streamlining the examination process
at a specific bank or working with higher-level regulators to initiate broad-
based changes. More stringent supervision might evolve as well. Examiners
might more aggressively seek out information from the bank in order to
enhance the precision of their assessment of the bank's situation. This
might also lead to broader-based change across banks as individual
examiners begin to experiment. For example, the level of banks' public
disclosures may be suboptimal because of market failures that regulators
can solve. Individual examiners may not be able to capture the entire value
of their innovation, but having some economic stake in the process at least
moves them in the right direction.
One might be skeptical that there is much that examiners could do to
increase firm value through regulatory innovation. But there is evidence
that regulatory choices matter. In the period before the Financial Crisis,
banks had a choice of regulator, and regulatory agencies competed to offer
the most attractive set of regulations and regulatory policies. 38 The
premise must have been a belief by banks that they could increase their
share price by choosing the "best" regulator. No doubt this scenario, like
our proposal, creates the potential for a race to the bottom. For our part, we
hope to solve this problem by not only awarding regulators the gains from
making regulations more efficient, but also penalizing them when their
regulatory choices result in bank losses or failures. But the point remains
138. Alex Blumberg, Chana Joffe-Walt & Dave Kestenbaum, The Watchmen, CHII. PUB. MEDIA
(June 5, 2009), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/382_transcript.pdf.
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that regulatory choices undoubtedly can increase bank value. Cabined by
the downside constraint on "deregulation," we nevertheless believe that
some of this value remains, or should at least be something regulators
pursue.
Although the theoretical case for linking bank regulators' pay to bank
performance seems relatively straightforward, the details of the incentive
structure are crucial. In the next part, we take a first pass at structuring a
regulatory pay-for-performance contract, recognizing that efficient
contracts will only be developed over time through trial and error.
V. THE STRUCTURE OF PERFORMANCE PAY FOR REGULATORS
The regulatory laxity in the run-up to the Financial Crisis involved
two distinct types of regulatory failure: the failure to apply preventive
medicine when times were good and the failure to act aggressively when a
bank showed signs of distress.139 Regulators' incentive pay should have
two distinct components to address these separate problems. The first is a
variable compensation component based on the market value of a mix of
the regulated bank's debt- and equity-based securities. This debt-equity
portfolio would offer real time market feedback to the regulator regarding
the bank's risk taking and its potential rewards. This component would
matter primarily during good times, while the bank is operating in the
ordinary course. Its purpose is to incentivize preventive and remedial
measures well before a bank approaches distress. The second component
becomes important as a bank approaches distress. It consists of a bonus for
which the regulator would be eligible based on the timing of her decision to
take over a failing bank. Regulators have a number of reasons to wait too
long before putting a failing bank into resolution.140 The takeover bonus
would ameliorate this problem.
We elaborate on these various features of our regulatory pay-for-
performance scheme below.
A. THE DEBT-EQUITY PORTFOLIO
We take lessons from the executive compensation literature to
structure our debt-equity portfolio for regulators. For the typical firm
manager, pay is linked to stock price, which is the best available metric for
139. See supra Part III.B.1.
140. See supra Part III.C.
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the value of the firm, as well as the social value of the enterprise. 141
Although imperfect, managers paid with firm shares have greater
incentives to increase the value of the firm than managers paid fixed
salaries.
If there were no externalities from individual bank activity or risk
levels, we could stop there. But of course externalities exist. Risk taking at
one bank can affect the financial stability of other banks and the banking
system as a whole, as the Great Financial Crisis has amply illustrated.
Together with the bank runs from the numerous panics of the 19th Century,
the Great Depression, and the S&L Crisis, these episodes confirm that
individual banks' activities have stronger social welfare implications than
nonfinancial firms. Hence the need for bank managers to be compensated
in a way that accounts for the potential social losses from their decisions, as
recent reform proposals argue. Our claim is that this is also true for
regulators.
As is true for bank managers, there is a ready proxy for the potential
bank losses that may fall on taxpayers. A publicly traded debt instrument is
sensitive to the downside risk of its issuer; it therefore provides the
downside analog of what share price signals about upside potential. While
it may make sense for bank managers to focus mostly on increasing bank
value subject to some downside risk, the opposite is likely true for
regulators. If we could design an optimal contract for CEOs, regulators
might be unnecessary, but absent such a perfect contract, a division of labor
in which managers focus mostly on gains while regulators worry most
about losses might be the most efficient. Accordingly, we believe the lion's
share of regulator's debt-equity portfolio should consist of the debt-based
instrument. This would give the regulator a personal financial stake in
curbing excessive risk taking at the bank. Holding only debt incentives,
however, might cause the regulator to be too risk averse, which would
unnecessarily limit credit availability and the bank's profitability. We
therefore also include equity-based pay in the regulator's pay package.142
141. The Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J. (May 8,
2011), http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/php/CEOPAYIl.html; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix
Them (Harvard NOM, Working Paper No. 04-28, European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance
Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=561305.
142. The pay of bank managers and regulators might be related. Though they play separate and
somewhat opposing roles, their respective pay structures could be substitutes for each other. The more
bank managers are paid in bank stock, the more regulators would need to be paid in bank debt in order
to police the extra risk taking that bank managers would be incentivized to pursue. Shareholders of a
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B. STRUCTURING THE DEBT-EQUITY PORTFOLIO
For both debt and equity components, awarding the actual securities is
not necessary.14 3 Instead, the underlying securities would be used as
benchmarks, with incentive pay based on the market price of the
underlying securities after a given reference date. For example, if
performance and incentive pay were awarded each calendar year, the
examiner would receive a "phantom" allocation of the bank's debt- and
equity-based instruments at the beginning of each year. This avoids the
conventional objections to government ownership of stakes in private
businesses and the potential for insider trading that might arise when
regulators sell securities to monetize gains.
To encourage a medium- to long-term regulatory perspective, each
year's allocation would have a specified maturity. At maturity, say three to
five years after the initial award, the allocation would be cashed out at the
then-market values of its underlying debt and equity components. With
regular periodic allocations with multi-year maturities, the regulator would
hold multiple tranches of phantom securities with staggered payouts,14
giving her incentive to consider the long-term as well as short-term
consequences of her regulatory decisions, and making short-term
manipulations of securities prices an unattractive strategy. We do not
attempt to divine the optimal maturity of each debt-equity allocation, which
we imagine would vary by agency, bank, time period, examiner, and other
factors. We anticipate that the optimal maturity will develop over time
based on experience.
Below, we describe a range of possible approaches for implementing
the examiner's debt-equity portfolio.
1. Bank Debt Incentives
We consider two potential benchmarks on which the debt feature of
this package could be based: (1) a subordinated debt security issued by the
bank might alter the pay of bank managers in light of regulator pay structures, and vice versa. We leave
it to another paper and a formal model in development to explore these issues more fully. For now we
simply claim that given the heavy equity weighting of bank CEO pay, regulators' incentive pay should
focus mostly on debt.
143. The examiner should not be allowed to trade in any of the bank's securities or instruments in
any event, so holding the underlying securities would not only be unnecessary, it would also be
forbidden. See infra Part VI.A.2.
144. For example, with a three-year holding period, after three years, the regulator would always
hold three tranches of phantom securities, which would mature in succession at the next three calendar
years' end.
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bank or (2) a credit default swap contract ("CDS") referencing a junior debt
obligation of the bank holding company that is the parent of the regulated
bank. 14 5 The prices of publicly traded subordinated debt securities and CDS
contracts reflect the market's best estimate of the risk of default of the bank
underlying the security or contract. We would adjust debt prices for
compensation purposes in order to filter out the effects of industry-wide or
market-wide debt price movements. To the extent possible, the regulator's
incentive pay should reflect bank-specific developments and not changes in
debt markets generally.
Subordinated debt ("sub-debt") is junior to depositor liabilities, and of
course is uninsured. When a bank fails, subordinated debt holders rarely
recover anything.' 46 Similarly, when a banking institution defaults on a
debt obligation referenced in a CDS, this triggers the obligation of the CDS
seller to pay the CDS purchaser for losses sustained on the insured amount
of the banking entity's defaulted debt.147 Sub-debt holders and CDS sellers
therefore have important incentives to monitor bank risk taking. If a bank is
healthy, its debt securities will trade near face value.' Similarly, the price
of its CDS contracts will be low.
When bank risk taking is excessive, however, sub-debt holders will
sell their debt. The market for subordinated bank debt is well
established,149 and banks engaging in excessively risky strategies will see
their sub-debt trading prices drop.s15 If the bank is at risk of default, its debt
145. A CDS acts like a debt instrument insofar as its trading price will reflect the default risk of
the reference entity. The CDS spread-the price one would have to pay to insure against the reference
entity's default-rises and falls with the probability of default. As discussed below, with respect to CDS
contracts referencing banking institutions, the reference obligation is almost always a BHC debt
obligation, and not an obligation of the bank itself. See infra Part V.B.2.
146. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy 45
(Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2010-03, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1522205 (noting that senior claimants are almost always paid in full, but junior claimants such
as subordinated debt and equity holders almost always receive nothing).
147. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not "Insurance" (U. Chi. Law &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 476, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1440945.
148. They may even trade above face value if market interest rates have dropped since the debt
securities were issued.
149. See Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to
Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 97, 103 (Frederic S.
Mishkin ed., 2001) (describing the market for subordinated debt as "well established," as well as "well
defined and homogenous"); infra Part V.B.2 (discussing subordinated debt versus CDS).
150. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-Debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures, 20 J.
FIN. SERVS. RES. 121, 133-35 (2001) (showing that sub-debt yield spreads perform slightly better than
capital measures as predictors of banks' financial conditions); Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu,
Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347,
1373-74 (1996) (demonstrating that bond yields reflect investors' pricing of bank risk taking); Diana
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securities will trade at a discount reflecting the probability of default and
the estimated payout in such event. Similarly, the price of a CDS contract
reflects the expected losses from loans, bonds, or other reference
obligations issued by the underlying bank. CDS spreads for contracts
written on large publicly traded financial institutions react very quickly to
new information.'51 Therefore, as bank risk taking increases, CDS dealers
will raise the price at which they are willing to sell CDS protection for the
banking institution's debt.
Market pricing serves as a transparent and continuing signal of the
riskiness of the bank's activities. Risk-related price fluctuations will
directly affect bank examiners' wealth when the debt component is
included in their personal portfolios. In this way, the fine reflection of bank
risk taking generates both important incentive and information effects. The
debt feature of an incentive contract would give the examiner incentive to
be vigilant in policing excessive risk taking at the bank.
Using CDS or sub-debt as a benchmark for examiner pay also serves
an important related function. Market pricing acts gradually to signal
changes in the issuing bank's risk profile, in contrast to the sudden
meltdowns that occurred at WaMu and other banks that failed in the Crisis
when regulators were too timid. Incorporating market-priced debt
instruments as part of regulator pay not only creates incentives for careful
risk analysis, but it also makes price changes more salient to examiners and
their supervisors as an indicator of the capital market sentiment concerning
risk taking at the given bank. This greater prominence for crowd wisdom
may make it more difficult for regulators to ignore mounting evidence of
trouble at a given bank. This information could be valuable as a warning
signal for an examiner to devote more resources to an examination or a
follow-up enforcement action. It might also be sufficiently finely tuned to
give direct feedback on micro-level regulatory changes. Just as a stock
price offers immediate signals to managers with imperfect information, so
Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is It
Feasible?, 20 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 147, 180 (2001) (finding that bonds of highest liquidity offer the most
consistent pricing information for purposes of reflecting bank default risk).
151. Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2085, 2088 (2010) (arguing that CDSs "responded to
new information more promptly and responsively than institutions (credit rating agencies) did"). Hart
and Zingales also propose to incorporate CDS pricing into the regulatory apparatus, noting its ability to
reflect excessive risk at the reference entity. They would use CDS, however, as merely a trigger for
regulatory action; they do not propose incentive pay for regulators or the use of CDS in that endeavor.
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions, 13 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 453, 456 (2011).
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too might public debt instruments help regulators adjust their allocations of
time and effort.
Empirical evidence supports the idea that regulators would respond to
debt incentives. Studies have shown, for nonfinancial as well as financial
firms, that firm risk taking declines as the proportion of a CEO's wealth
held in the form of her firm's debt-"inside" debt-increases relative to the
value of her equity holdings.' 52 The presence of this inside debt shifts
CEOs' personal interests away from risk-preferring equity, aligning their
interests more closely with relatively risk-averse debt holders.153
There is a theoretical explanation for this effect.' 54 Inside debt
counters the risk-shifting incentives that accompany CEOs' equity
compensation. 5s Giving managers a stake in the value of the firm's debt
makes them less willing to sacrifice its value to benefit shareholders, which
is especially important when the firm is in distress. Debt compensation can
improve managerial effort and firm value in distress situations because,
unlike equity, debt is sensitive to the firm's liquidation value. That is, debt
holders may still recover value when the firm is in distress. 5 6 Managers
152. See, e.g., BOLTON, MEHRAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 2 (finding the same for financial firms);
Tung & Wang, supra note 2, at 27 ("CEOs' inside debt holdings preceding the Crisis are significantly
positively associated with bank performance and significantly negatively associated with bank risk
taking during the Crisis."); Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Stockholder and Bondholder Reactions
to Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt Holdings: An Empirical Analysis 17-18 (Comell Univ. ILR
Sch., Comp. Research Initiative CRI 2009-005, 2009) (finding the same for nonfinancial firms).
153. See Kose John & Yiming Qian, Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking
Industry, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 109, 110 ("Top management
should .. .be given incentives to act on behalf of debtholders to an adequate degree.... [P]roviding
managers with compensation structures that have low pay-performance sensitivity may be optimal.").
Such compensation would admittedly dissuade bank executives from the traditional pursuit of value for
shareholders, which is sometimes viewed as corporate managers' exclusive goal. This should not give
us much pause, however. Bank governance has traditionally been recognized as presenting special
concerns that deserve special governance tools. See supra Part III.
154. See Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 78 (2011) (explaining a
"theoretical framework underpinning recent normative proposals to reform executive pay by
compensating the manager with debt as well as equity").
155. Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of equity and debt separately. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312 (1976). Edmans and Liu, on the other hand, consider
them simultaneously, thereby enabling analysis of the tradeoffs between incentivizing managerial effort
and influencing investment choice. Edmans & Liu, supra note 154, at 79 n.5.
156. Equity holders are indifferent to the firm's liquidation value because that value goes to pay
creditors. So while equity-based compensation gives managers an incentive to avoid insolvency, it may
also induce them to "inefficiently sacrifice liquidation value to gamble for solvency" when a firm is in
distress. Edmans & Liu, supra note 154, at 77. Debt holders will be less sanguine about squandering
value on desperate investment strategies because their returns are fixed; they will not share in any (low
probability but) stupendous returns beyond the fixed amount of their claims. Id
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holding inside debt may therefore be less inclined to make risky bets when
the firm gets into trouble. 5 7
Similarly, regulators with a stake in the value of a bank's debt
instruments will be less inclined to turn a blind eye to bankers' excessively
risky bets. Public trading prices of bank debt will operate as a continuing
public referendum on risk taking at the bank.
2. Subordinated Debt Versus CDS
While both bank subordinated debt and CDS could offer important
incentives and market information for regulators, there are important
differences between the two, such that their best uses may be different. As
between subordinated bank debt and CDS, evidence exists that CDS prices
react more quickly to information than subordinated debt prices do.'I This
sensitive bellwether would therefore offer more immediate feedback to
regulators than subordinated debt, so that prompt action could be taken.
Subordinated debt, however, may offer a few advantages over CDS.
Unlike sub-debt, which is issued at the bank level as well as the bank
holding company ("BHC") level, CDS contracts are typically written with
reference to BHC debt obligations and not those of the banking
subsidiary.' Therefore, CDS prices will more accurately reflect the
default risk of the BHC than the bank itself. Major banks are almost
uniformly held as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs,160 and every BHC
owns other financial institutions besides the bank at issue, although for the
very largest banks, each bank constitutes the dominant subsidiary within its
BHC. The larger the percentage of the BHC's cash flow and assets that
derive from the given bank, the better CDS pricing (that references BHC
debt) will reflect risks at the bank. But as the proportions of BHC assets
and earnings contributed by the bank decrease, so will the clarity of CDS
spreads decrease as a signal of the bank's health. Bank of America, N.A.,
for example, is the dominant entity within its BHC, Bank of America
Corporation. Yet the bank represents only about 65 percent of BHC assets
157. The appropriate amount of debt depends on the relative magnitudes of the two different types
of agency problems-shirking versus risk shifting. Id. at 77-78.
158. Robert Blanco, Simon Brennan & Ian W. Marsh, An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic
Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit-Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255, 2279 (2005).
159. We found one exception for which public pricing information was available. Bloomberg
quotes CDS pricing for Capital One Bank, a banking subsidiary of financial holding company Capital
One Financial Corporation. Pricing Information for 5 Year CDS Protection, BLOOMBERG (on file with
author) (last visited May 30, 2012).
160. Tung, supra note 2, at 1208.
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and contributes only about 70 percent of BHC net income.1 61 Performance
of the other entities within the BHC will likely have a nontrivial effect on
overall BHC performance, so that CDS spreads on Bank of America
Corporation may only offer a noisy proxy for risk taking at the bank, Bank
of America, N.A.
A second limitation with CDS is coverage. Most large banks issue
subordinated debt that is publicly traded. By contrast, regular CDS pricing
data is available for only a handful of the very largest BHCs.' 62 The very
largest banks and BHCs are of course the most important in terms of asset
values and systemic risk, so CDS still might be best for those institutions.
Where both bank sub-debt and BHC CDS pricing are available, it might be
useful to incorporate both into the debt component of regulators' incentive
pay.
3. BHC Equity
The debt component of regulator incentive pay should be balanced
with equity incentives in order to guard against the possibility of excessive
risk aversion. 163 Ideally, one would use bank equity as the benchmark,
since its trading price would offer the cleanest market assessment of the
bank's upside prospects, and therefore the best proxy for value added by
regulators. Again, however, because major banks are almost uniformly held
as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs, no major bank has publicly traded
equity. BHC equity is the next best option, though it may offer a somewhat
noisy proxy for performance at the banking subsidiary.' 64
Rather than rewarding (or punishing) the regulator simply based on
BHC equity price movements, we propose two adjustments to hone the
regulator's incentives. First, as with our debt component, we suggest a
relative performance approach, pursuant to which the effect of industry-
161. See Bank of Am. Corp., Consolidated Statements for Bank Holding Companies (Form FR Y-
9C), at 11 (Sept. 30. 2009) (showing total BHC assets of $2.25 trillion); Bank of America, N.A.,
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank with Domestic and Foreign Offices (Form
FFIEC03 1), at 10-11 (Sept. 30, 2009).
162. A Bloomberg search showed only nine BHCs with regular CDS pricing information. Pricing
Information for 5 Year CDS Protection, supra note 159.
163. Too much debt in managers' compensation packages may make them suboptimally risk
averse, reducing long term value. Rangarajan K Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside
Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007); David 1. Walker, The
Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. RFv. 435, 446-47 (2010).
We can anticipate a similar effect if regulators' portfolios are excessively overweighted with debt.
164. Among the ten largest banks, the average bank accounts for 61 percent of its BHC's assets
and 131 percent of its earnings. See infra app. 1.
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wide or market-wide equity price movements would be filtered out of the
regulator's performance pay. Ideally, an incentive-compensation scheme
would reward an agent for only those effects within her control. But
because no public securities exist to measure regulatory inputs alone, we
must settle for second best. To the extent we are able to excise market and
industry effects from the regulator's incentive pay, our scheme is
improved.
In addition to the relative performance adjustment, we suggest that the
regulator should be exposed only to the upside of the equity, and not the
downside. In other words, the regulator can only win with the equity-based
component. The reason for this is that exposure to downside equity
volatility might make the regulator too timid. With equity value to lose, the
regulator may be reluctant, for example, to expose poor management or
risky practices at the bank. The holding period for debt-equity allocations
addresses that problem to some extent. Given the inertia exhibited by
regulators in the run-up to the Financial Crisis, however, we should be
careful not to inadvertently incentivize inaction. This does not mean that
the regulator has nothing to lose, of course. The debt component of her
incentive pay includes downside potential but likely with less volatility
than equity.
4. The Appropriate Mix of Debt and Equity
As earlier noted, we believe the lion's share of this ordinary course
"preventive medicine" component of incentive pay should be debt based.
Beyond that, the appropriate debt-equity mix in the regulator's portfolio
will depend on a number of factors, some of which will be specific to the
regulated bank, to the regulating agency, to the particular times, and
perhaps even to the individual examiner. We therefore make no attempt to
offer firm prescriptions for the right ratio. Instead, we discuss important
considerations that regulatory agencies should consider when structuring
each regulator's portfolio.
The right mix can induce regulators to care about bank profits but not
at the expense of risk shifting to creditors. Excessive bank risk would
diminish net incentive pay, provided that the negative reaction from debt
markets reduced the value of the debt component of the regulator's
incentive portfolio by more than any positive reaction from equity markets
augmented the value of the equity component of the regulator's portfolio.
We are confident that the optimal mix can best be determined through
trial and error. Potential error costs, however, counsel for a gradual
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implementation of our proposal. Unlike executive compensation, where
experimentation can and does occur among thousands of private firms, and
a given firm's poor pay design would be unlikely to have widespread
impact, error costs may be high with regulator incentive-compensation
design. There are only a few bank regulatory agencies, and a significant
design mistake could affect the entire banking sector, and perhaps beyond.
Agency heads should therefore proceed slowly and incrementally. The
appropriate debt-equity mix is an area for which more study and a
conservative approach are likely warranted.
C. THE TAKEOVER DECISION
In addition to the market-based ordinary course component of
incentive pay, we advocate an additional feature to address the bank in
distress. Specifically, we propose a bonus tied to the timing of the decision
to take over a failing bank. Especially for larger banks, examiners will not
enjoy unilateral authority to put the bank into resolution. Instead, the
decision will involve higher-level supervisors as well as examiners.
Incentive pay for examiners still makes sense in this context. Examiners
will have the best information about their banks' condition and prospects,
and their experience with their banks will be critical in determining the
optimal timing of resolution. Even absent formal authority to decide on
resolution by themselves, examiners will enjoy enormous influence over
the decision. Incentives toward optimal resolution timing would encourage
examiners to be forthcoming with information important for the decision
and to make unbiased recommendations to higher-level regulators. These
inputs are crucial for improving resolution timing.
1. Why a Special Takeover Bonus?
The takeover decision requires special treatment for a number of
reasons. First, it is the most difficult and drastic decision the regulator must
make in her supervision of the bank. The regulator has a number of reasons
for being reluctant to pull the plug on a failing bank.s65 Regulatory capture
and the Stockholm effect may dissuade the regulator from taking over the
bank. Pulling the plug might also highlight the regulator's past mistakes in
not intervening more forcefully. At any given point, the regulator might
prefer to wait and see, hoping the bank will turn itself around. As the
Financial Crisis illustrates-like all others before it-regulators tend to err
on the side of taking over too late rather than too early. During the Crisis,
165. See supra Part ILI.C (discussing incentives for examiner nonintervention).
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this delay exacerbated banks' losses and the ultimate costs to the DIF. A
resolution bonus would offer a direct incentive to make the right timing
decision at a critical juncture.
Moreover, although the FDIC is charged by statute with the specific
goal of minimizing DIF losses in its dealings with troubled banks, 16 the
FDIC is typically not involved in the takeover decision, which rests with
each bank's chartering agency or primary federal regulator.'67 The FDIC
takes over only after a bank has been declared insolvent and put into
resolution. Because these other agencies do not have their own money at
stake in the timing of the takeover, the incentives to wait and see may be
overwhelming.
The bank debt-equity portfolio that we propose as part of the
regulator's compensation package may ameliorate this regulatory
reluctance to some extent. The debt piece of the portfolio could induce the
regulator to put the bank into resolution before it became massively
insolvent, since continuing losses at the bank would eat into the value of
the bank's debt and the debt portion of the regulator's incentive portfolio.
On the other hand, it might be difficult for the regulator to assess the bank's
solvency in real time, since this involves an assessment of the bank's asset
values. With uncertainty, a wait-and-see approach might seem attractive to
the regulator.168 The resolution bonus acts as a sort of consolation prize to
the regulator, who might otherwise be tempted to let the bank try to work
its way out of trouble to enable the regulator to recoup the losses suffered
in her bank debt-equity portfolio from the bank's demise.
Another reason for a special resolution bonus is that market signals are
likely to be noisy. Market discipline may not be useful in prodding a
regulator to declare a bank insolvent because of information asymmetry.
The optimal timing of the takeover decision will depend to a great extent
on fine-grained private information which (1) is available only to the
regulator, and (2) is constantly being updated in real time once takeover
becomes a real possibility. A one-time bonus distinct from any market
166. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2006) (requiring the FDIC to choose a method that is "the
least costly to the [DIF] of all possible methods for meeting the [FDIC's] obligation").
167. George G. Kaufman, FDIC Losses in Bank Failures: Has FDICIA Made a Difference?,
ECON. PERSP., Fall 2004, at 13, available at http://chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic_
perspectives/2004/ep_3qtr2004_p2_Kaufman.pdf.
168. Of course, if the debt-equity ratio is miscalibrated so as to be too equity rich, this will
exacerbate this wait-and-see problem. If the potential gains to equity, which prefers additional risk
during bad times, are greater than the potential debt losses, then this could induce the exact wrong
behavior in regulators. Weighting the incentive mix heavily with debt and having long holding periods
should help reduce this problem.
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assessment of the decision is therefore advisable.
2. Calculating the Bonus
Because of the importance of minimizing DIF losses, the resolution
bonus should be tied to the ultimate losses sustained by the DIF at the
resolution of the FDIC's receivership proceeding. Low losses should
trigger high bonuses and vice versa. In theory then, if an examiner were to
put a bank into resolution at time TI, and as a result FDIC losses were 100,
the examiner would get a larger bonus than if the decision were made at T2
when the FDIC losses would be 200. Implementing this simple idea may
not be straightforward, however.
First, if we could discern the counterfactual losses that would have
occurred at T2, then the calculation would be simple. But of course, a
takeover at T1 makes it impossible to know the counterfactual T2 outcome.
Second, it is entirely possible that a conscientious examiner might decide,
given the information available to her at TI, to wait until T2 for more
information. Important developments concerning the bank's prospects-the
direction of certain asset or lending markets, for example-might be worth
waiting for. Perhaps paradoxically, the more uncertain are the bank's
prospects, the more value there is in waiting.169 Third, even if a regulator
made an (ex ante) optimally timed decision to resolve a failed bank,
disposing of the bank's assets may take several years. That process will
affect the ultimate DIF loss figures and will not be under the examiner's
control.'70 So a "final" resolution will be hard to predict at the time of
169. The takeover decision involves a set of real options concerning the disposition of the
distressed bank's assets, including an option to forbear and see if the bank can work its way out of
trouble. The value of the wait-and-see option at T, increases with the variance of the bank's future
earnings, as well as its predicted growth. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy
Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 361 (2001). As compared with firms in unregulated
industries, however, the wait-and-see option for a failing bank may be less valuable because banking
regulators do not suffer the same information asymmetry as bankruptcy judges or other outside
decisionmakers. With a wealth of private information about the quality of the bank's assets and
management, banking regulators do not face the same degree of uncertainty about the bank's future
prospects as do actors tasked with deciding whether to pull the plug in other contexts.
170. For example, the OCC makes shutdown decisions for the national banks it supervises, but the
FDIC is required to be appointed as the receiver for every insured national bank. The FDIC sets the
structure of auctions for bank assets, as well as deciding on the timing of sales. It may also enter into
profit- or loss-sharing arrangements with asset acquirers in order to improve the terms of the sale.
Marissa Fajt, FDIC Finds Fresh Ways to Minimize DIF's Losses, AM. BANKER, Dec. 24, 2009,
available at http://americanbanker.com/news/fdic-1005554-1.html?zkPrintable=true. The OCC has
enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2006) (to make orders and formal written
agreements); id. § 3907 (to issue capital directives); id § 1831o (to take Prompt Corrective Action
("PCA")); and id. § 183 1p-1 (to issue safety and soundness orders). See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
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takeover.
Despite these seeming hurdles, a resolution bonus may still offer
important motivation for a regulator to act promptly in putting a bank into
resolution, as compared to the current compensation system. The timing of
takeover will no doubt have an important effect on the severity of DIF
losses, and warning signs in terms of bank characteristics and practices that
lead to large resolution losses are not so mysterious. Researchers have
identified factors that correlate with increased losses, as well as estimating
the economic magnitudes of the effects. The findings generally comport
with common intuition. Bank asset composition and quality affect ultimate
losses, 171 as does liability structure. 172 For example, brokered deposits are
positively associated with high-cost bank failures and shorter time to
failure.173 The same is true for real estate owned and loans past due.174
Uncollected income correlates with high-cost failures.175
Local economic conditions also matter. State personal income growth
and the health of the local banking industry are negatively correlated with
OF THE CURRENCY, OCC POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL, NO. 5310-3 (rev. ed. 2011), available at
www.occ.gov/static/publications/ppm-5310-3.pdf (providing overview of OCC's internal guidance
policies for enforcing laws, rules, and final agency orders). For a discussion of new resolution authority
rules for large banks and nonbank financial companies, see Brady Dennis, FDIC's New Tools to Close
Troubled Banks Offer Opportunity, Challenge, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2011, 8:43 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/17/AR2011011704164.html.
171. James R. Barth, Philip F. Bartholomew & Michael G. Bradley, Determinants of Thrift
Institution Resolution Costs, 45 J. FIN. 731, 739-43 (1990); John F. Bovenzi & Arthur J. Murton,
Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANK. REV. 1, 6-7 (1988); Christopher James, The Losses
Realized in Bank Failures, 46 J. FIN. 1223, 1229 (1991).
172. George G. Pennacchi, Risk-Based Capital Standards, Deposit Insurance, and Procyclicality,
14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 432, 442-43 (2005); Klaus Schaeck, Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss,
and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach, 33 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 163, 164 (2008).
173. See Schaeck, supra note 172, at 173 (measuring the ratio of brokered deposits to total assets).
Brokered deposits are large sums aggregated by brokers on behalf of investors looking to earn higher-
than-average returns on their FDIC-insured deposits. Banks seeking to lure these large deposits must
offer unusually high interest rates. The banks willing to chase these large deposits are often those in
financial trouble, seeking to increase their deposits in a hurry in order to grow their way out of trouble.
Id. at 177. But of course, in order to profit from these more expensive deposits, the bank must make
riskier bets with them. See Eric Lipton & Andrew Martin, For Banks, Wads of Cash and Loads of
Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2009, at Al (describing bank's use of "hot money"-brokered deposits-
to fuel risky growth).
174. Schaeck, supra note 172, at 172, 177. Real estate owned typically increases with loan
defaults, as banks foreclose on real property collateral. Similarly, loans past due of course increase with
borrower defaults.
175. James, supra note 171, at 1231; Schaeck, supra note 172, at 172, 177; Kathleen McDill,
Resolution Costs and the Business Cycle 18 (FDIC, Working Paper No. 2004-01, 2004), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/wp2004 0l/wp200401 .pdf. Uncollected income is a
measure of "nonperforming" loans-loans for which the borrower is behind in its payments. James,
supra note 171, at 1229.
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FDIC losses,176 while in-state bankruptcy growth and the unemployment
rate are positively correlated with FDIC losses. 7 7
The depth of existing research strongly suggests that a resolution
bonus algorithm could be constructed to both guide and cabin regulators'
discretion as to the timing of a bank takeover. Some trial and error would
be involved in optimizing the bonus structure in pursuit of minimizing DIF
losses, but with learning and experience, it might be possible to design a
fully automated system in which market and other data are incorporated
into the bonus algorithm.'7 8
Short of that, agencies can develop a mechanism for estimating what
losses would have been had examiners not acted when they did. For
example, postmortem reports, like those described above, could be helpful.
The inspector general of the FDIC could estimate losses at hypothetical
future intervals had the examiner not taken over the bank when she did.
These reports could deploy a mix of economic models, learning from past
failures, and expert opinions from inside and outside the regulatory agency.
This approach is not perfect, of course; it suffers from potential biases
and manipulation. Most obviously, since the report is written only after the
decision has been made to take over the bank, ex post biases may result in
loss estimates that differ significantly from what ex ante estimates would
have shown. This could lead to distorted incentives for examiners making
takeover decisions.
This problem is not fatal, however, so long as the potential biases are
not predictable ex ante-that is, estimates are not systematically too high or
too low. The use of external expert opinions to produce the loss schedules
described above could reduce any bias. So long as the estimate is not
expected to be biased one way or the other, examiners should be
incentivized simply to do their best-to time a takeover to minimize
losses-since this is what they will expect the ex post estimator to be
176. McDill, supra note 175, at 19. Since healthy banks in the vicinity of a failed bank are the
likeliest purchasers of the failed bank's assets, a weak banking industry translates into fewer and lower
bids for those assets. Id.; Schaeck, supra note 172, at 174.
177. McDill, supra note 175, at 14; Schaeck, supra note 172, at 174.
178. Moreover, to ameliorate these conflicting incentives, and consistent with the end-game
nature of the shutdown decision, at some point in the bank's downward spiral, the value of the
examiner's debt-equity portfolio should be frozen for compensation purposes so that the examiner's
only operating incentive is the shutdown bonus. With no additional portfolio upside to gain from a long-
shot recovery by the bank, the examiner's only focus will be on minimizing DIF losses from the bank's
failure. Of course, if the bank recovers and shutdown is avoided, the examiner's portfolio should be
unfrozen on the bank's way up.
[Vol. 85:10031054
PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE
doing.179 Some randomization among outside experts doing the ex post
analysis may help ensure the optimal ex ante incentives.180
Even if predicting ultimate FDIC losses is not an exact science for the
regulator making the takeover decision, neither is the loss assessment
inscrutable. A lack of research or analysis is unlikely to be the reason why
regulators have been too slow to pull the plug on failed banks. Empirical
studies-many done by the FDIC-and post-mortem reports, like those
described earlier, offer regulators a wealth of research to support the goal
of minimizing DIF losses. Instead, regulators may simply need better
incentives to get it right.
3. Additional Considerations
As to scale, the bonus should be potentially large enough to induce
regulators to forgo their hopes of recovering significant value in their debt-
equity portfolio from a miracle turnaround by the bank. Absolute values
would depend on a comparison of an examiner's expected payouts under
particular incentive contracts. If the examiner expects to receive $10 if the
bank survives and becomes profitable, but the potential downside to the
DIF has a positive expected value, then the examiner should be
compensated more than $10 for a good takeover decision.' 8 1
As the preceding discussion suggests, structuring takeover incentives
will be tricky. It may be that they even overshoot: examiners may be too
aggressive in taking over banks that have a positive private and social
value. One solution to this problem might involve a nontrivial penalty if the
DIF ultimately suffers no losses after a bank is resolved because the
examiner pulled the plug too soon. There should be a financial cost to this
socially inefficient decision.
Of course, too long a gap between the takeover decision and the
179. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1343, 1382-83 (2007) (explaining that ex post judicial review of
business decisions is deferential).
180. See id. at 1398 (suggesting court-appointed experts as a way to "encourage parties to submit
nonextreme valuations").
181. Although the shutdown bonus should offset the potential gains from a decision to forbear in
favor of a possible turnaround, this does not necessarily mean that the bonus must be very large. When
a bank is clearly distressed, the probability of turnaround will likely be very small. So even if potential
gains to the examiner from a long-shot recovery would be large, the expected value of forbearance
would still typically be small given the low probability of success. Multiplying the value from a
successful turnaround by the probability of that turnaround will reduce the value of that strategy for the
examiner. For example, if the examiner expects to earn $100 in the event that the bank recovers, but the
probability of this is just 10 percent, then the shutdown bonus need be no greater than $10.
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realization of the bonus, and the intercession of other actors in the asset
disposition process, may vitiate the incentive effect of any bonus. Ultimate
DIF losses and the related regulatory bonus will likely not be finally
determined until some months or years after the bank is seized, and asset
disposition decisions will be out of the examiner's hands. Nevertheless, the
takeover bonus may still offer important motivation for the regulator to act
promptly in closing down a bank, as compared to the current system of
compensation. Though the timing of takeover will have an important effect
on the final resolution and the amount of DIF losses, the regulator currently
has every incentive to wait to see, as was amply demonstrated during the
Financial Crisis. A well-structured bonus may help ameliorate this
problem.
VI. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
In this part, we raise and respond to some potential objections to our
proposal.
A. STRATEGIC AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES
Incentive structures may sometimes generate not only the desired
outcomes but also some that are unintended and undesired. Our regulator
incentive pay proposal is no exception. Time and experience will enable
agency heads to identify and address any bad incentives that may arise
from our proposal. In this section, we discuss a few of the possibilities for
bad incentives that we can anticipate.
1. Crowding Out the Public Interest
Some might object that incentive pay is fundamentally inconsistent
with public service. Financial rewards for "success" might change the
public-regarding culture within regulatory agencies; financial incentives
may crowd out the public spiritedness that would otherwise motivate
employees. The possibility of financial rewards tied to market metrics
might change regulators' perception of their charge. Instead of diligent
altruistic service to the public, regulators and other agency employees
might begin to view their roles in terms of market exchange. Regulators'
desiring higher compensation would pursue the proffered financial rewards,
while those who value leisure might feel free to work less and forgo the
potential financial rewards for diligence. Once diligence has been priced,
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perhaps some regulators will slack. 18 2
In addition, the type of person that chooses to be a bank examiner
could change. Regulators have employment choices, and we believe that
regulators' choice to be regulators derives at least in part from their interest
in public service. This public spirit is an important regulatory asset and
should be husbanded. Public service motives might be displaced by
financial motivations among new hires after implementation of an
incentive-compensation scheme. Eventually, the composition of the
regulatory agency could change for the worse.
We do not discount these concerns. Social scientists have documented
the crowding-out effect in experimental settings. We do not believe,
however, the effect is necessarily universal or sufficiently well understood
that experimentation with incentive compensation for regulators should be
precluded. 183 Moreover, as described above, the federal government has
already begun experimenting with financial incentives for regulators.
Enormous pay raises have been implemented at several executive agencies.
Bank regulators have received bonuses for good performance during the
Financial Crisis. These examples suggest that public spiritedness and
financial reward are not mutually exclusive, at least up to a point. Our
innovation is to rely on market pricing and specific observable outcomes to
set bonus pay, instead of relying on fiat. Ours is an incremental step
designed to link such bonus programs more explicitly to proxies for the
social welfare function of regulators, to make incentive pay more
transparent and less subject to political, class, racial, or other biases, and to
increase the sensitivity of such programs to performance.
Given our incremental approach, any selection effects from variability
of pay are likely to be minor, at least in the early stages. More generally,
the possibility that increased pay variability might change the mix of
individuals opting to serve as examiners could be a good thing. Examiners
screened by their commitment to the public interest were in fact
insufficiently attentive to that interest during the Financial Crisis.184
Accordingly, attracting individuals interested in a variable pay-for-social-
182. See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV.
687, 688 (2002) (discussing interaction of economic incentives with intrinsic and social incentives); Uri
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (2000) (describing an
experiment where the use of financial incentives led to worse performance by experimental subjects).
183. It may be, for example, that economic incentives may substitute for social incentives, but that
nominal economic incentives may be too weak. Cf Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 182, at 14-15
(finding that nominal economic rewards and penalties led to worse performance).
184. See supra Part HI.C.
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performance compensation structure may be a beneficial change.
2. Insider Trading
As with any incentive scheme involving publicly traded securities,
there is the possibility that security holders with access to nonpublic
information will use that information to earn profits at the expense of those
with access only to publicly available information. Our proposal to use
phantom securities with fixed redemption dates reduces this problem to a
great extent, since examiners enjoy no discretion as to the grant or sale of
their incentive securities.
Given that examiner bonuses depend on positive market price
movements, examiners may also be tempted at opportune moments simply
to leak nonpublic information about the banks they oversee. While this is
not an implausible scenario, examiners and other regulators already have
incentive to misuse nonpublic information they obtain in the course of their
work. For example, they may sell the information to traders. Or they may
use accomplices to trade based on their private information. Work rules
already restrict this misuse of information.
On the other hand, our proposal does increase the likelihood of misuse
insofar as it confers upon regulators an economic interest in the market
movements of certain bank securities that regulators might not have absent
our proposal. To the extent our proposal increases the risk of insider trading
or manipulation, agency heads may wish to augment prophylactic measures
to detect and deter these forms of misbehavior. To be sure, this is not a new
problem for financial regulatory agencies. We are confident that
appropriate measures exist to address this concern.
B. NOISY PROXIES
A basic objection to our approach is that it simply won't work. Our
market-based incentives may be too blunt to be effective. Even after
adjustments for relative performance, 85 many important influences besides
the regulator's input will affect the market pricing of the bank's debt and
equity securities. Decisions by the CEO and senior officers, for example,
will generally dwarf the regulator's influence over the bank's performance
and the market price of its securities. If the regulator's decisions have little
impact on the bank or the price of its securities, the argument goes, then
our scheme will have weak if any incentive effects on regulators.
185. See supra Parts V.B.1 & V.B.3.
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Moreover, though private firms often extend option compensation to
rank-and-file employees, and not just executives, there is some debate as to
whether broad-based option plans create effective performance
incentives. 186 No matter how much harder they work, individual employees
are not likely to be able to exert much influence on firm value. Given their
individual small shares in their firms, they might rather freeride than
increase their effort.187
These potential obstacles to performance pay schemes in private firms
should not detain us, however. Our situation is different. Regulators are not
tasked with the general goal of increasing banks' value. Their charge is far
more specific, and their incentive structure is more targeted. Regulators'
charge is to guard against excessive bank risk taking, and our debt-heavy
portfolio of phantom bank securities focuses regulators on that task. In a
well-run bank that does not incur excessive risk, it may be true-as with
rank-and-file employees in private firms-that examiners' ability to affect
the value of the bank's securities and their own debt-heavy portfolios is
weak or nonexistent. But that is as it should be. The regulator will not
object that a bank is not pushing the risk envelope. Moreover, in that
situation, the costs to the government of performance incentives are low,
since the market value of the bank's debt will probably not move much.
The bank's debt will enjoy a consistently low risk premium.
However, in the opposite scenario, when a bank pushes the risk
envelope and the market value of its debt declines, examiners have
personal financial incentives to respond.' 8 This is the situation in which
performance incentives cause the regulator's self-interest to correspond
with social welfare interests: regulatory intervention matters for social
welfare and performance incentives matter for the regulator. So unlike the
186. Compare John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees,
61 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 260, 274 (2001) (finding results consistent with the use of options to offer
performance incentives, as well as to attract and retain certain types of employees), and Semi Kedia &
Abon Mozumdar, Performance Impact ofEmployee Stock Options 31 (Working Paper, 2002), available
at http://www.nvc.vt.edulabon/eopt2.pdf (same), with Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms
Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN.
ECON. 99, 101, 118 (2005) (explaining broad-based option plans as mechanisms to sort employees and
improve retention, but rejecting a performance-based incentives explanation).
187. Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects?, 59 J. FIN. 1619,
1621 (2004) (noting the freerider problem among rank-and-file employees). See generally Armen
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REv. 777, 786 (1972) (discussing free riding in the face of profit sharing when the production
team is large). Firms may instead use broad-based option schemes to improve retention and employee
sorting. See Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 186.
188. The equity piece of the regulator's portfolio guards against excessive risk aversion. See supra
Part V.B.3.
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scenario of broad-based performance incentives in private firms, regulators
can anticipate the situation in which their intervention will matter a great
deal. If that situation never comes to pass, all the better.
Even in a private firm, though a given rank-and-file employee's
actions may not generally affect the valie of the firm or the value of the
employee's options, there may be specific situations in which the
employee's input is crucial, though it may be difficult to predict ex ante
which specific contributions by which employees will later be important.189
Similarly, with banks and regulators, it niay be that, especially during good
times, regulatory action has little effect on most banks' value or the value
of most banks' securities. However, when a bank strays, prompt and
effective regulatory action may be critical to avoiding large losses in the
future. For this bank and this regulator, the incentives may matter.
C. WHY NOT JUST IMPROVE BANK CEO INCENTIVES?
Given the existing learning on performance pay for executives, as well
as post-Crisis proposals to modify bank CEO incentive pay to address
excessive risk taking, one might fairly wonder why incentive compensation
should extend to regulators. Why not just tinker with bank CEO
compensation structure, as one of us has suggested?' 90
By itself, adjustment of CEO incentive structures is unlikely to offer a
complete solution to excessive bank risk taking. There are good reasons to
doubt that a CEO could be ideally incentivized in such a way that
regulatory effort would be unnecessary. Bank CEOs and regulators each
have specialized functions. They play different roles, with different
constituencies and different information sets. We could incentivize CEOs
to act like regulators, but then there would be far less play for conventional
corporate governance mechanisms to operate. The benefits of specialization
would be lost.
CEOs and regulators both suffer from bounded rationality as well. So
the conceptually optimal set of CEO incentives might either be too difficult
to comprehend, or if simplified, might be blunter than could be achieved
with the specialist regulator involved in affecting the CEO's behavior and
the bank's behavior. Similarly, attempting to craft optimal CEO incentives
in order to obviate the need for the regulator would require Herculean
expertise on the part of the crafter of the incentive structure (presumably
189. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 186, at 101 (noting that broad-based incentive compensation
might make sense where employees' actions can have very large value implications for the firm).
190. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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the regulator). By placing the risk brake firmly in the regulator's hands
(instead of or in addition to the CEO's), this enables adjustments to bank
risk policy no matter how the CEO's incentives are structured.
Moreover, regulator pay reform may offer more promise than banker
pay reform. First, it is easier for government to change its own behavior
and policies than to try to alter the pay practices of private enterprises.191
Resistance to the pay reforms proposed by the pay czar for a very limited
number of TARP companies exemplifies the difficulties that banker pay
reform proposals face. 192 By contrast, we see no reason why the President
or agency heads could not implement our proposal without much trouble.
Of course, regulators would still have to cajole or coerce banks in order to
affect regulatory policy, as compared to internal governance incentives for
bank CEOs. We view this as the more promising strategy, however, given
the demonstrated political resistance to government tinkering with
executive pay.
Second, as compared to regulators, bank CEOs might more easily be
able to nullify their debt incentives by simply passing their debt risk to
third parties.'93 Monitoring and enforcement of bank CEOs' portfolio
requirements are likely to be weaker than similar constraints on regulators,
who are already subject to conflict-of-interest rules,' 94 which could be
adapted to prohibit hedging strategies that neutralize their incentive
arrangements.
D. WHY NOT JUST IMPROVE EXAMINERS' INCENTIVES WITHIN THE
AGENCY?
A natural reaction to our market-based approach might be to try less
drastic, more incremental reforms first. The most obvious incremental
reform would be to simply improve examiners' internal incentive structures
within their agencies. Or perhaps agencies could improve their
organizational cultures to overcome the regulatory inertia we observed
during the Crisis. We have readily acknowledged the various moving parts
to our market-based approach that would have to be ironed out over time
with experience. Why undertake this wholesale change in examiner pay
191. See Tung, supra note 2, at 1247-51 (discussing implementation hurdles for banker pay
reforms).
192. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
193. For example, a put option on the CEO's debt holdings would effectively enable the CEO to
transfer the debt risk to the option writer.
194. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006) (prohibiting Executive Branch officers and employees,
including the Federal Reserve, from decisionmaking affecting personal financial interests).
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before less drastic measures have been tried?
Private firms, of course, use internal benchmarks to evaluate and
reward employee performance, as well as market-based instruments like
stock options. Internal benchmarking makes sense for private firms: certain
necessary "support" functions within private firms-strategic planning or
human resources or public relations, for example-do not contribute
directly to the bottom line. External market-based measures may therefore
offer poor indicators for employees' performance in these areas.
Despite this insulation from market indicators, however, we harbor
some faith that private firms can construct suitable internal evaluation
criteria for their employees. Poor internal benchmarks would hurt firms'
overall performance and profits, perhaps even leading to their demise.
With government agencies, of course, no similar market pressure
exists to correct poor internal benchmarking. Though the Crisis focused
more intense congressional and public attention on bank regulatory
agencies' performance, the agencies continue to exist in the wake of the
Crisis and examiners continue in their positions. We are not aware of any
examiner or high-level regulator losing her job as a result of poor
performance in the Crisis. The OTS was nominally eliminated under Dodd-
Frank: it was forced to merge into the OCC after having presided over the
massive failures of IndyMac Bank, AIG, and Washington Mutual.' 95 Even
there, the legislation goes to great lengths to assure that no OTS employees
will actually lose their jobs or suffer a pay cut!' 96 Each former OTS
employee must enjoy the "same status and tenure" in her new job as the
old.197 We are therefore skeptical that rearranging internal performance
metrics could offer a complete solution to the incentive problems we have
identified.
Moreover, our market-based approach can offer real-time incentives to
regulators that internal benchmarks cannot. Market metrics are likely to
impound the effects of regulatory action exactly when that action matters
195. Cheyenne Hopkins, OTS-OCC Merger Off to Ugly Start, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12, 2010.
196. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 322(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1529-1535 (2010) (mandating that each transferred OTS employee shall be
placed in a position at OCC "with the same status and tenure," and each employee's pay will be
protected for thirty months following the transfer); Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, A Thrifi
Regulator Fades (Sort o) into the Sunset, BUS. WK., Oct. 14, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com /print/magazine/content/10_43fb4200038824455.htm. This elimination
of an agency is, of course, quite rare. The demise of OTS was not solely a result of its failings in the
Financial Crisis. From its inception in 1989, many questioned the advisability of a separate regulator for
thrifts, and calls for its merger into the OCC or FDIC have been around as long as the agency itself.
197. Dodd-Frank § 322(e); Hopkins, supra note 195.
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most. For ordinary banking operations in normal times, a bank examination
is unlikely to disturb the bank's existing business model or affect the
market pricing of its public securities very much. However, with a troubled
bank, investors will keep a close watch over the regulatory actions to which
the bank is subjected, and the nature and effect of these actions will be
reflected in the bank's securities prices.
E. INCREASED COMPENSATION COSTS
Some might worry that market-based pay will potentially increase the
costs of compensating regulators. In boom years, for example, the value of
some examiners' phantom bank debt and equity portfolios might balloon in
value, independent of examiner performance. While this is certainly a
possibility, the government can easily hedge against this risk. Most
obviously, the government could hold debt and equity positions in banks
that exactly match the phantom securities held by examiners, dollar for
dollar. In this way, if the examiner's pay were to rise by $100 as a result of
an increase in a bank's value, the government's position would also rise by
$100, resulting in no effective increase in compensation costs.
One may object to the government taking ownership stakes in banks,
but this objection is not difficult to overcome. For one, the government
could take nonvoting stakes or contract away its voting interest in any
shares. Moreover, given the relatively small amounts of compensation
involved, the government stakes would be miniscule. Any ownership
influence the government might have would pale in comparison with the
other avenues by which it influences banks.
Derivatives and other synthetic instruments could address this
problem as well by simply replicating expected payouts under our
compensation scheme. Such instruments would not be difficult to create
and would avoid any government ownership stake in any bank. For
instance, the government could buy call options on bank stocks and debt
securities. Because such a call option locks in the price at which the
government may purchase a bank's stock or debt in the future, this
approach completely hedges the government's exposure to future
appreciation in the bank's securities.198 Importantly, options do not confer
control rights or other complications of government involvement with
198. A call option entitles the holder to buy a specified security at a predetermined price-the
"strike price"-for a specified period. Assuming the government purchases at-the-money call options
with the same duration as the phantom securities used for examiner compensation, the government's
hedging expense would be limited to the initial cost of the options.
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private firms.199
F. INCENTIVIZING THE RIGHT PEOPLE
A final potential objection is that our focus on bank examiners may be
incomplete because examiners constitute only one link in the supervisory
chain of command. There may be something to this objection. After all,
private firms deploy incentive compensation not just for the CEO, but for
decisionmakers at many levels in the hierarchy.
In the context of bank regulation, our proposal focuses on examiners,
but individuals both higher and lower in the hierarchy may also play
important roles in bank supervision. Their performance might also improve
with incentive pay. Line examiners provide crucial inputs to large and
complex examinations, while higher-ups-an Assistant Deputy
Comptroller or Deputy Comptroller for Large Bank Supervision, for
example 200-may have ultimate decisionmaking authority on how to
implement examiners' conclusions. 201 The incentive mechanisms we
describe could be used for all of these individuals, though additional
considerations must be addressed before deploying these mechanisms for
higher-ups.
Higher-level bank regulators typically have oversight responsibilities
for multiple banks. While incentivizing these regulators with public debt
and equity securities of the multiple banks they regulate might create useful
incentives, possibilities for strategic behavior abound. A regulator holding
a portfolio of banks' securities may be incentivized to maximize the overall
value of her portfolio, instead of improving the value of each bank. She
might decide, for example, to focus all her attention on the bank in her
portfolio that she believes holds the highest potential for appreciation. Or
more perversely, she might even sacrifice the value of one bank for a larger
increase in the value of another bank in her portfolio.
Incentive pay could be structured to discourage this kind of
opportunism. For instance, a higher-level regulator's portfolio of phantom
securities of multiple banks might be more debt-heavy than the portfolio of
an examiner responsible for only one bank. This debt emphasis would
199. The government could also purchase swap contracts to mimic the requisite cash flows from
phantom stock and debt appreciation.
200. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
201. Incentives might also be appropriate for FDIC officials responsible for resolving failed
institutions, since their actions also have important consequences for the severity of government losses
from bank failures. See supra Part V.C.1.
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magnify the effect of losses on the regulator's incentive pay, which would
encourage her diligent monitoring of all the banks under her supervision
and discourage her from attempting to pick favorites from among the
banks. More sophisticated indexing approaches could also be devised.
Agency heads are likely best positioned to identify the employees for
whom incentive compensation holds the most promise. In general, the
potential benefits of performance pay would seem greatest for individuals
with wide discretion and important decisionmaking authority in the
supervision process. Our review of bank failure reports and banking
supervision handbooks leads us to identify examiners as promising
candidates. We leave it to agency heads to work out over time whether our
pay-for-performance approach should be expanded up and down the
hierarchy.
Differential eligibility for incentive pay within an organizational
hierarchy may create unintended side effects in terms of promotion and
career progression. For example, examiners who receive bonuses might not
be interested in promotion to higher-level jobs where incentive
compensation is lower or nonexistent. While this is an issue to manage, it is
not uncommon. As noted above, firms often pay sales people with high-
powered incentive compensation that creates similar problems. Similarly,
securities and commodities traders typically enjoy high-powered incentive
pay that their supervisors do not. Even hourly workers may hesitate to
accept promotion to salaried supervisory positions, since accepting the
salaried job often forsakes overtime pay. Among regulators, one would
expect some efficient sorting, with regulators with different skills sorting
into positions based on their preferences and comparative advantages.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no reason we can think of why regulators are not paid for
performance. The crucial issues are whether one can identify what "good"
and "bad" performances are, whether contracts can be written ex ante that
operationalize these metrics, and whether the potential negative effects
from introducing a pay-for-performance culture for regulators outweigh the
potential efficiency gains. We have argued that bank regulation is an area
where there are readily available metrics, where plausible contracts or
payment schedules could be devised, and where the potential for crowd out
or other downsides from incentive pay are limited.
Accordingly, we propose that bank examiners be paid in part with a
mix of debt-heavy incentives linked to bank equity and debt values. This
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pay should represent a substantial but not dominant part of examiner pay,
should be paid out over a number of years, and should adjust in order to
maintain incentives aligned with the regulatory mission of ensuring that
bank risk taking is aligned with the social welfare.
Although seemingly radical, our proposal is consistent with recent
moves by regulators to pay bonuses for good work and to generally
increase the quality and efficiency of regulation. It is also consistent with
laws and academic proposals to alter bank CEO pay to take greater account
of the social component of bank losses. Our contribution is to merely point
out that regulator incentives are an overlooked but crucial factor affecting
bank risk taking, and that improving the social performance of banks and
the banking system requires a consideration of the incentives not only of
bank CEOs but also of bank regulators. Insofar as we can improve the
efficiency of government regulators, we need to worry less about the
structure of private incentives, which are further from the control of
government.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1.
Bank
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
CITIBANK, N.A.
WELLS FARGO BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
PNC BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
THE BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON
HSBC BANK USA,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FIA CARD SERVICES,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
STATE STREET BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY
TOTALS
as% of BHC
Assets Net Income
(USD, in thousands)
1,791,060,000 5,584,000
1,454,050,584 3,992,093
1,216,291,000 1,863,000
1,104,833,000 6,011,000
310,099,589 2,163,131
254,825,730 1,418,646
236,330,000 712,000
195,101,367 617,668
187,296,365 3,485,229
185,499,369 912,779
6,935,387,004
0.612624313
26,759,546
1.307336535
Note: All bank data is available at the FFIEC Search Page, https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
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TABLE 2.
BHC Assets Net Income
(USD, in thousands)
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION
CITIGROUP INC.
WELLS FARGO &
COMPANY
U.S. BANCORP
PNC FINANCIAL
SERVICES GROUP, INC.
BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON CORPORATION,
HSBC NORTH AMERICA
HOLDINGS INC.
BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION
STATE STREET
CORPORATION
TOTALS
2,198,161,000
2,276,418,250
1,947,815,000
1,244,666,000
311,462,000
259,500,612
266,571,000
369,534,704
2,276,418,250
170,236,334
11,320,783,150
5,555,000
2,049,141
2,999,000
3,759,000
1,046,000
837,547
625,000
1,078,313
2,049,141
470,609
20,468,751
Note: All BHC Data is available at National Information Center Top 50 BHC Page,
www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
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